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Are Things Falling Apart?1
Rethinking the Purpose and Function
of International Law
MATTHEW OLMSTED*
I. INTRODUcTION
Since the end of the Cold War, the Western discourse in
international law has increasingly focused on how to save the
"failed" or "outlaw" state.2 This discourse has risen to the level of
a strategic and moral din after the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001. With the primary aim of preventing Third World states
1. This title was appropriated from WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, THE SECOND
COMING (1922) ("Things fall apart, the center cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosened
upon the world").
. The author received his B.A. and J.D. degrees from the University of California,
Los Angeles and his L.L.M. degree from the London School of Economics and Political
Science. The author is currently an Assistant Attorney General for the Federated States of
Micronesia. Previously, he worked as a parliamentary assistant to a British Member of
Parliament, an associate at O'Melveny & Myers in Washington, D.C.; an Assistant U.S.
Attorney in the Southern District of California; and an election officer for the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo. The views expressed in this article belong to the author, and
not his current or former employers. The author would like to thank his wife Susi and son
Sebastian for their support, and Professor Igor Stramignoni for teaching him to search for
poetic awareness by thinking outside, over or other.
2. See generally GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES (2004)
[hereinafter SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS]; Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a
Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 903 (1997); Gerald B. Helman &
Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL'Y 3 (1992); Sebastian Mallaby,
The Reluctant Imperialist, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2002); Henry J. Richardson, III, "Failed
States", Self-Determination, and Preventative Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and
Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1996); Ralph Wilde, The
Skewed Responsibility Narrative of the "Failed States" Concept, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 425 (2003). The term "save" means not only to rescue or preserve from harm, but also
to deliver and redeem from evil and sin. While a failed state may require saving because
its infrastructures have collapsed, an outlaw state requires saving from the sins it
propagates on its own peoples or other states. The purpose of this article is to rethink the
issue of saving by asking, "Who are we really trying to save - them or ourselves?"
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from becoming "reservoirs and exporters of terror," scholars,
policymakers, and journalists have advocated various paradigms to
redeem these states from their collapsed governmental
infrastructures (the failed state scenario) or from their illegal acts
of internal or international violence (the outlaw state scenario).'
Such paradigms have included placing conditions on development
or humanitarian aid,4  engaging in forceful humanitarian or
democratic intervention,5 instituting post-conflict United Nations
transitional administrations,6 returning to a trustee system,7 and
even bringing back old-fashioned colonialism.8 In the last fifteen
years, these paradigms have become the tools for collective or
unilateral interventions of various degrees in Libya, Panama, Iraq,
Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Rwanda, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, East Timor, Sudan, Afghanistan,
and more.9
3. Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, 81 FOREIGN AFF., 127, 128
(2002); see Wilde, supra note 2, at 426 (discussing Western legal scholars' definition of the
"failed state"); see Gerry Simpson, Two Liberalisms, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 537, 560-65
(2001) [hereinafter Simpson, Two Liberalisms] (discussing Western legal scholars' various
definitions of an "outlaw state").
4. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6
EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1994); see also Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of
International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of
Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 624-26 (2002) (discussing how the World Bank
and IMF seek to promote good governance through conditions on development loans).
5. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 239
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian
Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, 10 FINNISH Y.B. OF INT'L L. 141 (1999); Fernando
Tes6n, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323 (1996).
6. See, e.g., Rotberg, supra note 3, at 127; Michael J. Matheson, United Nations
Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 76 (2001). For a general analysis of
United Nations state-building efforts, see Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and
Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 583
(2001).
7. See, e.g., Helman, supra note 2, at 12-18; Inis L. Claude, Jr., The United Nations of
the Cold War: Contributions to the Post-Cold War Situation, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 789,
790-93 (1995).
8. See, e.g., William Pfaff, A New Colonialism?, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1995); Paul
Johnson, Colonialism's Back - And Not a Moment Too Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993,
at 6.
9. James Thuo Gathii has commented that "[s]ince the end of the Cold War, an
industry in international legal circles has developed around justifying more
interventionism in international affairs to protect human rights, avert or attend to
international humanitarian emergencies, install democracies, monitor elections, and
oversee transitions from authoritarian one-party states and military regimes, among a
variety of similar do-gooder programs and projects." James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism,
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The legal debate surrounding the failed or outlaw state
phenomenon has centered on whether established principles of
sovereignty and self-determination permit unilateral or collective
intervention into the internal affairs of non-Western states to
remedy the perceived causes of their failure or criminality, namely,
terrorism, fundamentalism, nationalism, and tyranny. However,
this debate ignores two main presumptions (along with a
genealogy of more general presuppositions descending from each
of these presumptions) that underlie the concept of the failed or
outlaw state.
First, the failed/outlaw state concept presumes that when a
state collapses or commits illegal acts of internal or international
violence, "the state, its people and its leaders are solely
responsible."' ° Under this presumption, the state itself failed or
turned to a life of crime. This presumption is derived from the
liberalist presupposition that since 1945, "ex-colonial states have
been internationally enfranchised and possess the same external
rights and responsibilities as all other sovereigns."" Thus, the
Third World states' own cultural and political immaturity, rather
than the vestiges of colonialism, account for the failing
governmental infrastructures. This presupposition of sovereign
equality is, in turn, based on another presupposition that
colonialism was an exceptional, ephemeral, and non-integral part
of international law. 3 Finally, at bottom, is the idea that
international law evolved toward universality by extending
"sovereignty to all states without making the invidious cultural
distinctions between the civilized European and the uncivilized
Colonialism and International Governance: Decentering the International Law of
Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996, 2010 (2000) (critiquing BRAD ROTH,
GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999)).
10. Wilde, supra note 2, at 426; see Simpson, Two Liberalisms, supra note 3
(discussing international legal scholars' various definitions of an "outlaw state").
11. ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD 21 (1996).
12. Id. at 25. Those who contend that the vestiges of colonialism and imperialism
remain are typically accused of either attempting to shift the blame or engaging in a
useless debate. See Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy and Neocolonialism:
Response to Review by James Thuo Gathii, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2056, 2065 (2000)
[hereinafter Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy] (arguing that Gathii's characterization of
"contemporary international law as essentially continuous with patterns of past Western
domination ... scarcely promises a more effective defense to the phenomena - economic
disempowerment, cultural imperialism, and the proposals to subject 'failed states' to
trusteeship - against which he inveighs").
13. Gathii, supra note 9, at 2019.
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non-European that had served in the nineteenth century to
exclude non-Europeans from the realm of sovereignty while
subjecting them to colonialism.'
14
The second presumption underlying the concept of the failed
or outlaw state is that the state at issue falls below a certain level
of success (in the case of a failed state) or law-abidingness (in the
case of the outlaw state). 5 But this presumption necessarily
presupposes an existing benchmark against which to judge the
success and lawfulness of these states. Since the concept of the
failed or outlaw state originated in Western scholarly and policy
discourse, it must further be presupposed that the modern
Western nation-state provides the benchmark; otherwise, Western
scholars would be in the predicament of deeming their own states
as failures or outlaws. This, in turn, presupposes that "Western
models ultimately offer the only reasonable alternative to the
current state of international affairs" and that "Western
philosophy, science, and culture remain the sole guarantors of
international stability and prosperity.' ' 16 Thus, so long as a state
remains different from Western states, it is considered stagnant,
declining, or 'Third World,' and therefore deserves to be treated as
such. At the bottom of this lineage of presuppositions is the idea
that the world is divided into states that are successful, lawful, and
rational (i.e., Western states), and those that are not (i.e., non-
Western states).
The two presumptions that underlie the concept of the failed
or outlaw state are inherently contradictory. One assumes
universality in which all states are treated equally under
international law. The other assumes division in which states that
cannot, or do not, conform to the Western model of a modern
state are inferior and, therefore, subject to unequal treatment. One
speaks of increasing inclusion, while the other speaks of perpetual
exclusion. One preaches the end of history; and the other
prophesizes the clash of civilizations. 7 This seemingly obvious
contradiction is entirely missing from the mainstream
"sovereignty" debate regarding failed or outlaw states. Yet, not
14. Anghie, supra note 4, at 514.
15. Gathii, supra note 9, at 2018; see also Wilde, supra note 2, at 428.
16. SIBA N'ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI SOVEREIGNS, AND
AFRICANS: RACE AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1996).
17. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992);
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993).
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only is this contradiction essential to the resolution of the problem
of the outlaw or failed state, but it beats at the very heart of
international law, its institutions, and its prescriptions. It is how
international law has reconciled the presumption of universality
with that of division that contributes to (if not causes) terrorism,
fundamentalism, nationalism, and tyranny in the world.
International law is part of the problem, not the solution, of failed
and outlaw states.
This article seeks to rethink the purpose and function of
international law from an entirely different perspective. It
proposes to show how international law employs techniques of
universality and division along the continuums of time and space
to acquire knowledge and power over difference. To do so, this
article adopts a postmodern approach in which "[w]riting about
otherness is writing otherwise., 18 As Barbara Stark observed,
postmodernism is "the method of choice of the 'omitted,' the
excluded, because it focuses on those narratives at the margins
rather than on those at the center."' 9 Furthermore, since
transgressing boundaries is characteristic of the postmodern
method, it allows comparisons with works of other genres.20 For
this reason, this analysis is based on the two texts, Orientalism by
Edward Said, and Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison by
Michel Foucault.2 While these writers are not legal scholars, they
nevertheless provide new insights into the function and purpose of
international law.
This article is divided into four parts. Section II briefly
explains why I have chosen these particular authors and texts as
the basis of my comparison. The next section discusses how the
historical methodologies found in Discipline and Punish and
Orientalism challenge international law's metanarrative that
depicts its legal history as an evolutive process toward universal
and neutral legal principles. The history underneath this
18. PETER MASON, DECONSTRUCTING AMERICA: REPRESENTATIONS OF THE
OTHER 4 (1990).
19. Barbara Stark, After/word(s): "Violations of Human Dignity" and Postmodern
International Law, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 315, 318 (2002).
20. Id. at 319 n.26; Stephen Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World: A
Flying Elephant, 84 MINN. L. REV. 673, 693-97 (2000).
21. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Allen Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH]; EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (Penguin Books 2003) (1978) [hereinafter
SAID, ORIENTALISM].
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metanarrative shows how international law uses universalism and
division along the time and space continuums to control a vast
number of cultures, peoples, and histories. Section IV addresses
Said's and Foucault's theories of resistance to show how, far from
preventing or rehabilitating failed and outlaw states, international
law has created them. Section V analyzes these issues in the
context of the ongoing Iraqi crisis that is a quintessential case of
international law's attempt to create and dominate an outlaw state.
II. WHY SAID AND FOUCAULT?
Even before the coalition forces marched into Baghdad in the
sequel to the 1991 Gulf War, international legal and political
scholars in the United States already began talking extensively
22
about how to build a democratic Iraq. While this rush to
democratize was not unprecedented, other post-conflict
democratization drives (in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, for
instance) appeared more justifiable given that both the
international community and the warring factions publicly agreed
that self-determination was the primary goal of those conflicts. In
Iraq, however, the coalition was not there to liberate a people, but
rather to promote its own interests, whether those interests were
national security, oil, or the elimination of an old adversary. In
fact, President George W. Bush repeatedly disavowed any desire
to engage in the state-building activities of his predecessor, in Iraq,
23or anywhere else. Moreover, it was not universally clear that the
people of Iraq wanted international help with democratization - or
at least their voices were noticeably absent from the state-building
discourse. If our interests were not self-determinative, and their
interests were yet unknown, then what was the driving force
22. See, e.g., Daniel Byman, Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and
Opportunities, 28 INT'L SECURITY 47 (2003); Adeed Dawisha & Karen Dawisha, How to
Build a Democratic Iraq, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 36 (2003); Kanan Makiya, A Model For Post-
Saddam Iraq, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 5 (2003).
23. During his election campaign, then-Governor George W. Bush stated (quite
presciently), "If we don't stop extending our troops all around the world in nation-building
missions, then we're going to have a serious problem coming down the road." See Vice
President Gore and Governor Bush Participate in Presidential Debate (Oct. 3, 2000), at
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/debates/transcripts/u221003.html; see also Mallaby,
supra note 2, at 5-6. Even after the terrorist attacks of September 11, President Bush
maintained this position, refusing to commit peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan. Only
after public pressure following the occupation in Iraq did he appear to change his view
regarding state-building.
[Vol. 27:401
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behind this democratization project?
The search for this unidentified driving force led me to
Edward Said, whose works are not only critical of the international
treatment of Iraq since 1990,24 but also include Orientalism, which
is considered one of the founding texts on postcolonial studies. 
2
While Orientalism focuses primarily on how literature over the last
two centuries created and re-created the Orient, his work is
"deeply informed by, and engaged in commenting upon, the
dynamics of political and cultural interaction in world politics and
the relationship of the West to the non-West." 26 However, the
scope of Orientalism extends beyond Middle East politics. Said
seeks "to illustrate the manner in which the representation of [the
West's] 'others' has been institutionalized since at least the
eighteenth century as a feature of its cultural dominance. 2 ' As
*Said states in the preface to the 2003 edition of Orientalism, the
book "for all its urgent worldly references, is still a book about
culture, ideas, history and power, rather than Middle Eastern
politics tout court.' 8 Thus, Orientalism offers a methodology for
analyzing how international law, which is also a product of
Western culture, ideas, history, and power, perpetuates the
29colonial and imperialist legacies of earlier centuries.
At its core, Orientalism is about cultural dominance. Through
the analysis of texts by various Western authors, Said shows how
Western culture has sought over time to represent and dominate
its "others" in a way that has allowed it to maintain a superior self-
image.3° In its material manifestation, Said defines Orientalism as
24. See, e.g., Edward Said, When Will We Resist?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2003)
[hereinafter Said, When Will We Resist?]; Edward Said, A Window on the World,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Said, A Window on the World]; see also SAID,
ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 2003.
25. JACINTA O'HAGAN, CONCEPTUALIZING THE WEST IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: FROM SPENGLER TO SAID 185 (2002).
26. Id. at 185-86.
27. BILL ASHCROFT & PAL AHLUWALIA, EDWARD SAID 49 (1999).
28. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at xii.
29. Although this article uses the terms interchangeably, Said defines "imperialism"
as "the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a
distant territory" and "colonialism" as "the implanting of settlements on distant territory."
He argues that while colonialism has largely ended, imperialism "lingers where it has
always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological,
economic, and social practices." EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 8
(1993) [hereinafter SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM].
30. See SAID, ORIENTALISM supra note 21, at 12, 32. In a 1995 review of
ORIENTALISM, Said described the intention of his work as a "multicultural critique of
2005]
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"the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient - dealing
with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it,
describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short,
Orientalism as a Western style of dominating, restructuring, and
having authority over the Orient."31
Here enters Foucault. To identify Orientalism, Said expressly
relies on Foucault's notion of discourse, and its implied
relationship between knowledge and power, as described in
Discipline and Punish and Archaeology of Knowledge. Said
contends that "without examining Orientalism as a discourse, one
cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline
by which European culture was able to manage - and even
produce - the orient politically, sociologically, militarily,
ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-
Enlightenment period., 32 While this assertion implicitly references
Foucault's ideas about power in Discipline and Punish, Said offers
no further explanation of his indebtedness to Foucault.33
Nor is it entirely self-evident how Foucault's book about the
birth of the prison system in modem Europe relates to the study of
cultural imperialism and the relationship between the West and
the non-West. As one commentator observed:
Foucault had a lot to say about power, but he was curiously
circumspect about the ways in which it operated in the arenas of
race and colonialism. His virtual silence on these issues is
striking. In fact Foucault's work appears to be so scrupulously
Eurocentric that you begin to wonder whether there isn't a
deliberate strategy involved. 4
power using knowledge to advance itself." Edward Said, East Isn't East: The Impending
End of Orientalism, 4792 TIMES LITERARY SUPP. 4 (Feb. 3, 1995) [hereinafter, Said, East
Isn't East].
31. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 3. Said also defines "Orientalism" textually
as an academic discipline and a style of thought. Id. at 2-3. While the corporate institution
definition is the one most relevant for purposes of this article, all three definitions are
interrelated and illustrate how "Orientalism is a complex web of representations about the
Orient." ASHCROFT & AHLUWALIA, supra note 27, at 57.
32. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 3; see also Edward W. Said, Foucault and
the Imagination of Power, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER 153 (David Couzens Hoy
ed., 1986) [hereinafter Said, Foucault and the Imagination of Power] (commenting that
"Foucault is certainly right - and even prescient - in showing how discourse is not only
that which translates struggle or systems of domination, but that for which struggles are
conducted").
33. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 23.
34. Robert J. C. Young, Foucault on Race and Colonialism, 25 NEW FORMATIONS 57
408 [Vol. 27:401
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Said shared this perception about the Eurocentricity of
Foucault's work. 5 Nevertheless, as Sara Mills observed, primarily
because of Said's use of Foucault's theories in Orientalism, "[p]ost-
colonial theory . . . has consistently drawn on and reacted to
Foucault's work and, in some instances, has tried to make it more
profoundly political or materialist and even compatible with
psychoanalytical thought., 36 Thus, in order to better understand
Said's ideas about culture and imperialism in Orientalism, they
should be analyzed alongside Foucault's ideas in Discipline and
Punish. The latter provides the methodological springboard for the
former, to the extent that the two works both converge and
diverge. Moreover, together they suggest how international law
functions as a means of dominating and confining the West's
"other."
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW'S COUNTER-NARRATIVE
A. The Orthodoxy
In his article, Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover observes
that "[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from
the narratives that locate it and give it meaning . . . . Once
understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning,
law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a
world in which we live." " Therefore, the narrative that is chosen to
describe international law has an enormous impact on the world's
disparate human communities.38 Unfortunately, instead of a lively
debate over the history of international law, one metanarrative is
accepted, almost dogmatically so, among Western international
legal scholars.
(1995).
35. See Edward Said, Wild Orchids and Trotsky, in POWER, POLITICS, AND
CULTURE 167 (Gary Viswanathan ed., 2001) [hereinafter Said, Wild Orchids]; Edward
Said, Michel Foucault, 1926-1984, 4 RARITAN (1984), reprinted in 7 MICHEL FOUCAULT:
CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 261, 267-68 (Barry Smart ed., 1995) [hereinafter Said, Michel
Foucault 1926-1984]).
36. SARA MILLS, MICHEL FOUCAULT 30 (2003).
37. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4,4-5 (1983).
38. See Stark, supra note 19, at 321-22.
39. Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM.
J. INT'L L. 313, 316 (1907) (remarking that "[t]he history of international law is certainly
the most neglected province").
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This metanarrative describes international law as progressing
towards increasingly greater equality among nation-states in which
current international legal norms reflect universal values that
promote the welfare of all.40 Thus, the modern period "introduced
a system in which states, for the first time, are treated equally and
in which international law aspires to global coverage.",4' The
orthodox Western view of the history of international law with
regard to sovereign equality among nation-states can be
summarized as follows. Prior to the seventeenth century, the
international system was highly centralized. The Catholic Church
exercised spiritual dominion over Europe and the Holy Roman
Empire exercised political control over the same. Gradually, the
Holy Roman Empire began to dissolve and was replaced by a
system based on territorial sovereignty and the nation-state. The
watershed moment came with the Westphalian peace settlement of
1648, which Western publicists typically attribute to origins of both
their discipline and the modern idea of sovereign equality among
nation-states.42 Westphalia "emasculated the Empire, reducing it
to one among many sovereigns, and begins a process by which the
state becomes a standard item of social organization eclipsing the
multifarious forms in existence at that time., 43 From Westphalia
forward, international law increasingly became "the voice of
civilization, of the center, of the modern, of the future, and of
universal humanism and progress against, or in dialog with, the
voices of the non-Christian world, the primitive, underdeveloped,
non-Western, outlaw world of those who do not yet see things
from a high place."" According to this metanarrative, to consider
Europe the nucleus of this evolution is not egocentric at all
because it merely places the emphasis on "the active agent in a
process of which ... the rest of the world was merely the passive
object.,
45
Within this metanarrative, colonialism and imperialism are
explained as nineteenth century aberrations in international law's
40. See SIBA N'ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, supra note 16, at 11-12.
41. SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS, supra note 2, at 12.
42. See id. at 30.
43. Id. at 35.
44. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 335, 359 (2000).
45. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS: A STUDY OF WORLD SOCIETY
28 (3d ed. 1964).
[Vol. 27:401
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quest for universality. For example, Charles Alexandrowicz insists
on the historic universality of international law, arguing that it was
tainted by Eurocentricism only in the nineteenth century.
46
Similarly, both Henry Reynolds and Georges Abi-Saab argue that
the prevalent doctrinal assumption before the period of the
Westphalian peace settlement was that the universality and
neutrality of international law transcended the confines of Europe,
and it was the (mis)interpretation of these neutral laws by the last
two centuries of empire builders that resulted in the colonial
aberration. 7 Less apologetically, L.C. Green asserts that the past
imbalance between the West and non-West has been exaggerated.
While capitulation treaties entered into between the colonizer and
the colonized had flaws, they were consistent with the
international practice of the time. In short, while scholars accuse
the politicians of the colonial period of selectively applying
international norms to further their own self-interests,
international law itself is exonerated. Since the transformation of
colonial territories into sovereign states, and the establishment of
the principle of self-determination, modern international legal
scholars view international law as now truly universal and
cosmopolitan.49
Whether self-classified as positivists, naturalists, liberals or
realists, international legal scholars overwhelmingly support the
universalistic narrative of international law. ° Jonathan Sacks aptly
labeled this metanarrative "Plato's Ghost" which has haunted
Western imagination ever since this The Republic philosopher
argued that only ideas and concepts are real, eternal, and
immutable." Moreover, all these approaches to international law
46. See CHARLES HENRY ALEXANDROWiCz, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY
OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES 47-59 (1967). See generally SIBA
N'ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, supra note 16, at 120.
47. See Georges Abi-Saab, International Law and the International Community: The
Long Road to Universality, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 34, 39-40 (Ronald St.
John MacDonald ed., 1994); Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy, supra note 12, at 2065; see
e.g., HENRY REYNOLDS, THE LAW OF THE LAND 46 (1992).
48. See L.C. GREEN & OLIVE P. DICKASON, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE NEW
WORLD 14-20 (1989).
49. See Anghie, supra note 4, at 513-14.
50. See GREEN & DICKASON, supra note 48, at 33; see also Steve Smith, Is the Truth
Out There? Eight Questions About International Order, in INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND
THE FUTURE OF WORLD POLITICS 99, 111 (T.V. Paul & John A. Hall eds., 1999).
51. Jonathan Sacks, The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of
Civilizations, ORBIS 603 (2002).
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bow to the sanctity of the nation-state. While scholars dispute
whether nation-states are, or should be, equal, and whether
international institutions can, or should, limit their freedom to act
in their self-interest, these legal theorists take for granted that the
nation-state is the essential building block of any international
legal order. What is lacking is a counter-narrative, and Foucault
and Said provide the essential tools to begin constructing one.
B. Foucault's Theories about Discipline
1. A Genealogical Approach to History
At the onset of Discipline and Punish, Foucault declares his
rejection of Western teleological approaches to history when he
tells the reader why he is writing a history of penal reform: "Why?
Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by
that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one
means writing the history of the present. 5 2 As Mark Posner
observes, "Foucault is not proposing a new metaphysics of history
in which one age is ontologically separate from the others. Rather,
he attempts to extract from the complexity of the past certain lines
of struggle because . . . they can have an impact on the way we
think about the structures of domination in the present. '5 3 In this
way, Discipline and Punish displays Foucault's general aversion to
"the form of history that reintroduces (and always assumes) a
suprahistorical perspective; a history whose function is to compose
the finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed
upon itself; a history that always encourages subjective
recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the
displacements of the past. 5 4 To Foucault, such a subjective
approach hardens the "error we call truth" into an unalterable
form.5 To avert this pitfall, Foucault employs an approach to
history, derived from the Nietzschean concept of genealogy, which
reveals "the exteriority of accidents.
5 6
52. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 31.
53. Mark Poster, FOUCAULT, MARXISM AND HISTORY: MODE OF PRODUCTION
VERSUS MODE OF INFORMATION 100 (1990).
54. Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy and History, reprinted in THE FOUCAULT
READER 86 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984) [hereinafter Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy and
History].
55. Id. at 79-80.
56. Id. at 81.
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Foucault's genealogical approach explains why the post-
Enlightenment period stands center stage in Discipline and Punish.
For Foucault, the modern individual and the concept of society
were joint projects of this period." The post-Enlightenment
humanists attempted to reconcile the need to govern society with
individual liberties by disassociating power (viewed as negative
and restrictive) from truth (considered benign and
emancipatory).5 s Foucault seeks to expose the fallacy of this
project, stating "we must cease once and for all to describe the
effects of power in negative terms. In fact, power produces; it
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of
truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him
belong to this production. 5 9 Far from providing a triumphant story
of evolutionary emergence between individual liberties and liberal
society, Foucault shows how the individual is the "fabricated
reality" of a disciplinary society. 6° He accomplishes this by studying
how the prison emerged as the predominant method of
punishment over two other methods: the medieval method of
torture and public execution, and the classical humanist method of
correct representation. This study reveals that this transition from
the spectacle of public execution to prison "is not a transition to an
undifferentiated, abstract, confused penalty; it is the transition
from one art of punishing to another, no less skillful one. It is a
technical mutation. ,
61
Torture and the public execution were the traditional,
monarchical means of punishment based upon a "policy of terror"
intended to "make everyone aware, through the body of the
criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign., 62 For
Foucault, the public execution did not re-establish justice but
rather displayed on the body of the condemned person the
dissymmetry of power between the sovereign and those who
challenged his laws. It reactivated power in a ritual of violence in
57. Id. at 241-42.
58. See William V. Spanos, Heidegger, Foucault, and the "Empire of the Gaze":
Thinking the Territorialization of Knowledge, in FOCAULT AND HEIDEGGER: CRITICAL
ENCOUNTERS 235, 267 (Alan Milchman & Alan Rosenberg eds., 2003).
59. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 194.
60. See HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND
STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 143 (1983).
61. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 257 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 49.
63. Id. at 109.
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which "the body of the condemned man became the king's
property, on which the sovereign left his mark and brought down
the effects of his power."6 But while the king usually prevailed in
this contest, it was costly and inefficient; each time his power was
challenged, he had to respond with a surplus amount of power in
order to restore his control over the realm.65
The disproportionate and grotesque nature of both torture
and the public execution led a group of humanist reformers in the
Classical period to advocate an alternative means of punishment.
These reformers observed that the "hand-to-hand fight between
the vengeance of the prince and the contained anger of the people,
through the mediation of the victim" was not only revolting, but
also politically dangerous as the criminal was often pitied or
elevated to heroic status by a sympathetic public.66 According to
Foucault, the penal reformers sought a gentler form of punishment
that touched the soul rather than the body, that not only addressed
the wrong but "obtained a cure," in order to bring the offender67
back into the fold of society. Moreover, humanity now sought to
impose a limit on punishment.6 To achieve these objectives, the
humanists promoted a whole technology of representational
punishment through which a correct ordering of social life could
be achieved. 69 Each punishment was carefully imposed to closely
correspond with the crime in order to immediately alert the public
to the crime and the corresponding remedy. For instance, murder
was punished by death and idleness by hard labor. Punishment
could therefore function "as a deterrent, recompense to society,
and a lesson, all immediately intelligible to the criminal and
society. Yet, beneath the reformers' humanitarian agenda
lurked the true objective of the reform movement:
Not so much to establish a new right to punish based on more
equitable principles, as to set up a new 'economy' of the power
to punish . . .so that it should be distributed in homogenous
circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a continuous way,
down to the finest grain of the social body ... [N]ot to punish
64. Id.
65. Id. at 50; see DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 60, at 145.
66. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 61, 73.
67. Id. at 22.
68. id. at 92.
69. id. at 104.
70. DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 60, at 148.
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less, but to punish better. .. ."
The representational form of punishment, however, was
never fully realized. It was supplanted by the disciplinary
technologies which manifested in the form of prisons. While these
technologies adopted a few characteristics of Classical
criminology, including a detailed classification of crimes and an
economy of punishment, they contradicted others. In particular,
punishment no longer rested on didactic moral insight through
public representation. Rather, it focused on the secret, detailed,
and studied manipulation of an individual's body through the
application of administrative techniques of power." Although
disciplinary technologies had long existed in armies, workshops
and monasteries, it was not until the post-Enlightenment period
that the disciplines became an art of dominating the body in a way
that "makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and
conversely."73
Thus, the disciplines introduced a means of meticulous
control that both increases utility and decreases resistance, thereby
creating what Foucault termed "docile bodies." The fundamental
question addressed in Discipline and Punish is not, therefore, why
torture was replaced by a gentler form of punishment, but rather
how "the coercive, corporal, solitary, secret model of power to
punish [came to] replace the representative, scenic, signifying,
public, collective model.
7 4
Foucault suggests at least three reasons for this "colonization
of the penalty by the prison."75 First, because the disciplinary
technologies operated outside public view, they were more
effective at silencing the criminal than the public execution -
which allowed the criminal to give public death speeches that often
mocked the sovereign or proclaimed their innocence - and
representative punishment - which allowed the criminal to
participate in a kind of public morality play. As Dreyfus and
Rabinow note, "[w]ith the disciplinary society, human beings
71. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 80-82; see Spanos, supra
note 58, at 256; Bob Fine, Struggles Against Discipline: The Theory and Politics of Michel
Foucault, in 4 MICHEL FOUCAULT: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 320 (Barry Smart ed., 1995).
72. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 128-29; DREYFUS &
RABINOW, supra note 60, at 152.
73. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 137-38.
74. Id. at 131.
75. Id. at 117.
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became objects to be molded, not subjects to be heard or signs to
be circulated or read., 76 This silencing effect also permitted power
to inscribe a history of its own choosing upon the body of the
criminal. Second, the disciplinary technologies offered the best
means of controlling a large number of people with relatively few
personnel, which Foucault later labels "the problem of the
accumulation of people."77 Foucault finds that towards the end of
the eighteenth century there was a "shift from criminality of blood
to criminality of fraud" in order to infuse the mechanisms of power
into the everyday lives, behaviors, and identities of individuals.8
More types of crimes meant more criminals requiring punishment
and surveillance. As will be seen in the next section, the beauty of
the disciplinary technologies is that - unlike the other two forms of
punishment - in their optimal form they are omnipresent and self-
sustaining. Third, the disciplinary technologies maximize power
through a meticulous control of the body that assures the constant
subjugation of its forces and a relation of docility-utility.79 The next
section will also show that in order to accomplish this docility (and
its corresponding increase of power) the disciplinary technologies
continuously regulate and manipulate dimensions of time and
space.
2. The Panopticon's Use of Time and Space
In Discipline and Punish, both space and time are essential as
the means through which the disciplinary technologies seek to
create docile bodies. Moreover, it is how the disciplinary
technologies reconcile seemingly opposing spatial and temporal
processes that provide maximum effectiveness for their
domination and control over a large number of individuals.
Turning first to Foucault's theories about space, Discipline
and Punish relates how the modern disciplines derived their spatial
tools from the historical methods of dealing with two diseases.
First, leprosy "gave rise to rituals of exclusion., 80 The leper was
caught up in a practice of rejection and exile-enclosure in which he
was cut off from the rest of society and "left to his doom in a mass
76. Michel Foucault, The Eye of Power, in FOUCAULT LIVE 230 (Sylv~re Lotringer
ed., 1996).
77. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 77.
78. Id. at 137.
79. Id. at 198.
80. Id. at 198.
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among which it was useless to differentiate. 81 Second, the plague
gave rise to the disciplinary project whereby instead of a "binary
division between one set of people and another, 8 2 the plague-
stricken town demanded:
[an] enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in
which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the
slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are
recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the
centre and periphery, in which power is exercised without
division, according to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which
each individual is constantly located, examined and distributed
among the living beings, the sick and the dead - all this
constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism. 3
Thus, between leprosy and the plague, two different scenarios
of exercising power over individuals existed (the leper and his
separation, and the plague and its segmentations), along with two
different political dreams (a pure community free from leprosy,
and a disciplined society during the plague).8 Foucault suggests
that the nineteenth century witnessed these seemingly disparate
projects coming together in the disciplinary technologies. "Treat
'lepers' as 'plague victims,' project the subtle segmentations of
discipline onto the confused space of internment ... individualize
the excluded, but use procedures of individualization to mark
exclusion."85 Thus, these disciplines operate in a dual mode: that of
"binary division and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/harmless;
normal/abnormal), and that of coercive assignment, of differential
distribution (who he is; where he must be; how he is to be
characterized; how he is to be recognized; how a constant
surveillance is to be exercised over him in an individual way,
etc.)."86 Foucault asserts that the disciplinary technologies achieve
this dual mode through the interplay of hierarchical observation
and normalizing judgment.
Under hierarchical observation, architecture is no longer built
primarily to be seen or to observe external space as were the
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 197.
84. Id. at 198.
85. Id. at 199; see STUART ELDEN, MAPPING THE PRESENT: HEIDEGGER,
FOUCAULT AND THE PROJECT OF A SPATIAL HISTORY 146 (2001).
86. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 199.
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medieval fortresses. Instead, it seeks to facilitate internal, constant,
and detailed control. Accordingly, the ideal disciplinary apparatus
is one that would ensure total subjugation. "[It] would make it
possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly. A central
point would be both the source of light illuminating everything,
and the locus of convergence for everything that must be known: a
perfect eye that nothing would escape and a center towards which87
all gazes would be turned." Hierarchical surveillance enables the
disciplinary power to be both "absolutely indiscreet since it is
everywhere and always alert," and "absolutely discreet since it
functions permanently and largely in silence, thereby minimizing
the need to resort to violence. 8 The normalizing judgment, in
turn, provides standards that both unify the operations of the
disciplines and solidify their punishments to fine level of
specification.89 These standards are directed against a range of
behavior that includes faults (such as lateness, untidiness, and
uncleanliness) and nonconforming attitudes (such as insolence,
disobedience, and disloyalty).9° By establishing these standards,
normalization not only homogenizes, but it also individualizes and
hierarchizes through comparison, "making it possible to measure
gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties and to render the
differences useful by fitting them one to another."9' Thus, for
Foucault, it is unsurprising that normalization thrives alongside the
Enlightenment principles of equality and emancipation "since
within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces, as a
useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading
of individual differences." 92
Disciplinary technologies combine hierarchical observation
and normalized judgment into a 'normalizing gaze' or
'examination,' making it possible to qualify, classify, and punish
the individual while simultaneously maintaining its own
invisibility. 93 Thus, unlike in the ancien regime, where visibility
ascended toward power (i.e., the monarchy), in a disciplinary
87. Id. at 173.
88. Id. at 177.
89. See Dreyfus & Rabinow, supra note 60, at 158; see Elden, supra note 85, at 139.
90. See ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND THE LAW: TOWARDS A
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE 21 (1994).
91. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 184.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 183-84.
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regime it descends from it: "as power becomes more anonymous
and more functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be
more strongly individualized."9 4 According to Foucault, it is this
inversion that assures the exercise of power even in its lowest
manifestations through infinite examination and compulsory
objectification. 9 The disciplines make individuals, not by overt
force, but by combining hierarchical observation and normalizing
judgment.
Turning to the disciplinary technologies' temporal processes,
Foucault argues that they achieve docile bodies through both
seriation and totalization. Using as an example Demia's
suggestions for teaching children in Lyon how to read in stages,
Foucault explains that seriation makes possible "a detailed control
and a regular intervention ...in each moment of time" and
permits the characterizing of individuals according to a specific
level in the series. Seriation additionally allows for the
accumulation of time that is "totalized and usable in a final result"
of an individual's capacity. The combined result is that power is
"articulated directly onto time," 96 thereby making time a useful
method of subjugation:
The disciplinary methods reveal a linear time whose moments
are integrated, one upon another, and which is orientated
towards a terminal, stable point; in short, an 'evolutive' time.
But ... at the same moment, the administrative and economic
techniques of control reveal a social time of a serial, orientated,
cumulative type: the discovery of an evolution in terms of
'progress' . . . . With the new techniques of subjection, the
'dynamics' of continuous evolutions tends to replace the
'dynastics' of solemn events.
97
Thus, by exercising the body through these temporal
processes, the disciplinary technologies are able to bend "behavior
towards a terminal state," making possible "a perpetual
characterization of the individual in relation to this term, in
relation to other individuals, or in relationship to a type of
itinerary." 98 Yet, the terminal state is never fully achieved because
the disciplinary technologies exercise bodies towards a subjection
94. Id. at 193.
95. Id. at 189.
96. Id. at 160.
97. Id. at 160-61.
98. Id. at 161.
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that never reaches its limit. Herein lies the lesson: the history the
disciplines inscribe on our bodies is the very same evolutionary
history that Foucault's genealogical approach rejects because it
hardens the error of truth into an unalterable form.
For Foucault, the ultimate model for the convergence of time
and space is the Panopticon. This Benthamite invention consists of
the large circular building, in the middle of which stands a tower
with wide windows facing the inner side of the ring. The peripheral
building is divided into cells with two windows: one facing the
tower and the other facing the outside, thereby allowing light to
traverse the entire cell. 99 In the Panopticon, the cells of the
periphery "are like so many cages, so many small theaters, in
which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly
visible."1°° The inmate is seen, but cannot see; "he is the object of
information, never a subject in communication."1 1 Moreover,
because power is both visible and unverifiable, the Panopticon
induces the inmate into a conscious state that assures the
automatic and continuous functioning of power. The inmates
become their own bearers of the power relation and, therefore, the
actual exercise of power becomes unnecessary.1 0 By automatizing
and de-individualizing power, Panopticism avoids physical
confrontation and dispenses with the need for the king.03 It is "a
machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise the
power as well as those who are subjected to it .... It becomes a
machinery that no one controls." Moreover, Panopticism is
polyvalent in that the panoptic scheme may be used whenever one
seeks to impose a task or particular behavior on a multiplicity of
individuals.05 Indeed, by de-institutionalizing the Panopticon, the
disciplines have permeated society:
Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under
the surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the
great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous,
concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication
are the supports of an accumulation and centralization of
99. Id. at 200.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 200.
102. Id. at 201
103. Id. at 208.
104. See Foucault, supra note 76, at 234.
105. Id. at 261; see Spanos, supra note 58, at 261.
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knowledge;. . . it is not that the beautiful totality of the
individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order,
it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it,
according to a whole technique of useful forces and bodies.'
6
In sum, the ceremonies and marks by which the sovereign
formerly manifested its surplus power have been replaced by a
disciplinary machine through which constant and detailed
surveillance assures difference and individuality, while at the same
time produces conformity and universality. This is Foucault's
counter-narrative.
C. Said's Theories about Orientalism
1. A Musical Approach to History
In Orientalism, Said studies how the West has come to know
the Orient, since the beginning of the post-Enlightenment period,
through various academic disciplines, institutions, and styles of
thought. In doing so, he argues that "without examining
Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the
enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was
able to manage - and even produce - the Orient."'17 Said's
appropriation of Foucault's disciplinary history, as well as his ideas
about the inseparability of knowledge and power, has generated
much of the methodological debate over Orientalism.°'8 While it is
not the purpose of this article to join this debate, it will
nonetheless show that the multitude of the criticisms read both
authors' works too narrowly. Just as Discipline and Punish is not
merely about the history of prisons, neither is Orientalism merely a
history of the West's mistreatment of the Orient. Fundamentally,
Orientalism is about the struggle for cultural dominance, and it is
how Said reconciles his own ideas about cultural domination with
Foucault's conception of disciplinary society, and applies them on
a global scale, that provides the underlying methodology for his
book.
As one commentator observed, while Said does not articulate
his historical approach in Orientalism itself, he adopts a
106. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 217.
107. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 3.
108. See ABDIRAHMAN A. HUSSEIN & EDWARD SAID, CRITICISM AND SOCIETY 228
(2002).
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methodology that counteracts "what he considers to be the
univocality, linearity, and evolutionism of traditional
historiography.'10 9  Other commentators have linked Said's
methodology in Orientalism to Foucault's genealogical approach. 110
Indeed, in the 1995 Afterword to Orientalism, Said speaks in
Foucaultian terms when he states that "[just as] the struggle for
control over territory is part of that history, so too is the struggle
over historical and social meaning. The task for the critical scholar
is not to separate one struggle from another, but to connect them,
despite the contrast between the overpowering materiality of the
former and the apparent otherworldly refinements of the latter." ''
Yet, while both Said and Foucault describe history in terms of
space,'12 Said's most perceptive observations about history are
auditory. In Culture and Imperialism, his self-proclaimed sequel to
Orientalism,"' Said discusses the musical concept of 'counterpoint'
whereby "various themes play off one another, with only a
provisional privilege being given to any particular one; yet in the
resulting polyphony there is concert and order, an organized
interplay that derives from the themes, not from a rigorous
melodic or formal principle outside the work.""14 He describes
counterpoint more vividly in relation to Beethoven's symphonies:
[T]he symphonies go back and forth out of chronological order.
And then, of course, a listener has accumulated memories of
other performances .... So, it's a fantastically rich experience,
which is, in fact, an experience in organizing, re-organizing,
disorganizing, and organizing sound again. Sound is no longer
just linear but also horizontal, diagonal, top to bottom, bottom
to top, middle to forward, middle backwards, and then across
109. Id. at 130.
110. See JACINTA O'HAGAN, CONCEPTUALIZING THE WEST IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: FROM SPENGLER TO SAID 188 (2002); JAMES CLIFFORD, THE
PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE AND
ART 266 (1988).
111. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 331-32. In a subsequent interview Said
states that "it becomes possible to see engagement in the historical process as in fact a
collective struggle - not a struggle to be won by an individual subject trying to grasp the
whole of history in all of its complexity.., but a collective struggle in which various
interests interact over particular sites of intensity and contested domains." Overlapping
Territories, in POWER, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 57-58 (GARY VISWANATHAN ED., 2001).
112. Compare Foucault, supra note 21, at 84-85 (describing history as a struggle
between forces at a "'pure distance' or a "'non-place"').
113. See Wild Orchids, supra note 35, at 85.
114.SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 59-60.
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pieces, in such a way as to create, in effect, a new whole - the
meaning of which is paradoxically withheld.1'5
Placing history in sound, as well as in space, enables Said not
only to envision struggles but to hear them through multiple andS116
simultaneous narratives, without the need to reconcile them. He
then proceeds to apply this contrapuntal approach in his textual
interpretations to elicit a "simultaneous awareness of both the
metropolitan history that is narrated and of those other histories
against which (and together with which) the dominating discourse
acts.,,.7
If Orientalism presents a history of a struggle, then what
precisely is this struggle over? Said answers this question by
declaring that his book takes:
a step towards an understanding not so much of Western
politics and of the non-Western world in those politics as the
strength of Western cultural discourse, a strength too often
mistaken as merely decorative or "superstructural." My hope is
to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination
and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers
and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves or
upon others!
18
Indeed, throughout the introduction to Orientalism, Said
repeatedly emphasizes that he is primarily concerned with the
struggle for cultural dominance. He describes the Orientalist
discourse as the systematic discipline by which European culture
was able to manage the Orient,"' and later remarks that "the
major component in European culture is precisely what made that
culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of
European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the
non-European peoples and cultures."' 20 A few pages later, Said
states that it was culture that created the West's interest in the
115. DANIEL BARENBOIM & EDWARD W. SAID, PARALLELS AND PARADOXES 140
(Nadine Gordimer ed., 2002).
116. See Edward W. Said, Criticism, Culture, and Performance, in POWER, POLITICS,
AND CULTURE 269 (GARY VISWANATHAN ED., 2001) 99-100 ("multiple identity, the
polyphony of many voices playing off against each other, without . . the need to reconcile
them, just to hold them together, is what my work is all about"); see also Hussein & Said,
supra note 108, at 228.
117. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 59.
118. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 25.
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id. at 7.
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Orient and that "acted dynamically along with brute political,
economic, and military rationales to make the Orient the varied
and complicated place that it obviously was in ... Orientalism.''
1
21
According to Said, the West's struggle for cultural dominance is
related to our search for identity through difference. 22 He argues
that modern Orientalism began at the end of the eighteenth
century with the discovery of the roots of Western language in
ancient Oriental idioms, such as Sanskrit.' 3 From that point
forward, the West sought to establish an identity distinct and
superior to that of the East. While Said adheres to the view that
every culture discovers its existence through and in difference, he
is critical of the way in which Western culture approaches a
heterogeneous, dynamic and complex human reality from an
uncritically essentialist standpoint that suggests "both an enduring
Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western
essence, which observes the Orient from afar and, so to speak,
from above.' '124 That the reconciliation of culture and identity is a
central theme in Orientalism should come as no surprise given
Said's personal struggle with his own cultural identity as a result of
living between the two worlds of Palestine and the United States.2
5
This theme, and Said's own experiences, also explains why the
solutions he offers to address Orientalism's dogmas focus on
multiculturalism.1
26
Viewed as a book about cultural domination, Orientalism
presents a narrative that is remarkably similar to Foucault's
genealogy of the soul with Orientalism playing a role similar to the
disciplinary technologies in furthering the subjugation of the
"other." Like the modern disciplines in Discipline and Punish,
121. Id. at 12.
122. In a subsequent publication, Said writes of "the power of culture to be an agent
of, and perhaps the main agency for, powerful differentiation within its domain and
beyond it too." EDWARD W. SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT, AND THE CRITIC 9 (1983).
Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, supra note 27, at 88 (finding that Said's conception of culture "is
both a function of and a source of identity").
123. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 42, 136; see Stuart Schaar, Orientalism at
the Service of Imperialism, in ORIENTALISM: A READER 182 (A.L. Macfie ed., 2000)
(finding that the translation of Avesta texts into French 'jolted old beliefs and revealed to
Europe the existence of ancient cosmogonical traditions beyond the Mediterranean basin'
as well as questioned the uniqueness of the Bible).
124. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 332-33.
125. Id. at 339; Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, supra note 27, at 79; see Wild Orchids, supra
note 35, at 2250-26.
126. See SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 328.
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Orientalism is not a specific institution (although it too can
manifest itself institutionally); rather, it is a family of ideas. 27 In
addition, Said views culture as Foucault perceives power: its
durability and persistence rests in its ability to produce rather than
inhibit. 2
Moreover, just as the disciplines permeate society,
Orientalism is both a subtle and refractive "distribution of
geopolitical awareness into ascetic, scholarly, economic,
sociological, historical, and philological texts" as well as an
"elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction ... but a
whole series of 'interests' which . . . it not only creates but also
maintains. 1 29 Furthermore, Said shows how Orientalism, like the
disciplines, obtains its durability and strength not through
governmental coercion, but through the consent of civil society.13 °
In fact, Said defines "culture" as "an environment, process, and
hegemony in which individuals (in their private circumstances) and
their works are embedded, as well as overseen at the top by a
superstructure and at the base by a whole series of methodological
attitudes."''
Another important parallel between Said and Foucault's
theses is that Orientalism, like the disciplinary technologies,
provides a capacity for domination "within a purportedly liberal
culture, one full of concern for its vaunted norms of catholicity,
plurality, and open-mindedness. 1 32  In fact, in some ways,
127. Id. at 46. Some critics have had trouble coming to terms with Said's description of
Orientalism as an idea or construct, rather than as an ideology, movement, or set of social
institutions that can be comprehensively studied with historical precision. See, e.g., David
Kopf, Hermeneutics versus History, in MacFie, supra note 123, at 196.
128. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 14.
129. Id. at 12; see Hussein & Said, supra note 108, at 239.
130. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 6-7.
131. Id. at 8. The frequent criticism that Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony is
incompatible with Foucault's notion of micro-physics of power fails to recognize that
Foucault never disputes that ruling classes or hegemonies exist. See VALERIE KENNEDY,
EDWARD SAID: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 26-32 (2000). Indeed, the historical context
of Discipline and Punish is the rise to power of the bourgeoisie class following the French
revolution, and Foucault elsewhere speaks of 'detaching the power of truth from the forms
of hegemony, social, economic and culture, within which it operates at present time.' See
Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in Macfie, supra note 123, at 43. Moreover, while for
Foucault power is everywhere, as discussed above, the disciplinary technologies use
hierarchical observation as a means of rendering bodies docile. Disymmetry and
disequilibrium is essential to the functioning of a disciplinary society.
132. See SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 254. In his sequel to this book, Said
comments that it is "genuinely troubling to see how little Britain's great humanistic ideas,
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Orientalism offers a more insightful explanation for this paradox.
In the third chapter, Said draws a distinction between 'manifest'
and 'latent' Orientalism. The former is the "various stated views
about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology,
and so forth" that account for any changes that occur in knowledge
of the Orient.133 Latent Orientalism, on the other hand, is "an
almost unconscious (and untouchable) positivity" that provides the
"doctrinal - or doxological - manifestation of an Orient."'13 4 Rather
than staking its existence upon openness and mutual
understanding, latent Orientalism provides a stable consistency
through the perpetuation of four dogmas: that there exists an
absolute difference between the rational, developed West and the
aberrant, undeveloped Orient; that abstractions about the Orient
say more than its modern realities; that the Orient is eternal,
monolithic and incapable of defining itself; and that the Orient is
something to be feared or controlled.' It is in this way, Said
argues, that Orientalism has persevered through revolutions, wars,
and decolonization.36
This distinction between manifest and latent Orientalism
explains how imperialism coexisted alongside Enlightenment
ideals of emancipation and equality. To Said, the differences of
opinion that the nineteenth century writers had about the Orient
were superficial; underneath they all adhered to "the separateness
of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent
indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability." '137
Moreover, these writers believed the Orient solicited the West for
attention, reconstruction, and redemption. Thus, scholars such as
Franqois Chateaubriand and John Westlake argued not only that
the Orientals require conquering, but that it was not really
conquest at all, but liberation. By way of literary example, in
Culture and Imperialism Said describes how Marlow, the narrator
in Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness, contrasts the ancient
Romans with their modern imperialist counterparts in Europe.
institutions, and monuments ... stand in the way of the accelerating imperial process. We
are entitled to ask how this body of humanistic ideas co-existed so comfortably with
imperialism." Kennedy, supra, note 131, at 97.
133. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 206.
134. Id. at 206, 221.
135. Id. at 300.
136. Id. at 222.
137. Id. at 206.
138. Id. at 172, 206-07.
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While the Romans conquered though brute force, Europeans were
"saved" by their "devotion to efficiency" and "redeemed" by their
"unselfish belief in the idea."'39 What is interesting about this
comparison is that it melds Enlightenment values (the idea) with
economic (efficiency) and religious (salvation, devotion) practices.
The modern European imperialist is saved from the ugliness of
conquest both because the native and the imperialist are equally
ringed by the efficiency of colonial administration, and because
conquest is the means through which natives may be freed from
their primitive existence.' 4° As one commentator suggests, "[t]he
crudeness and raw brutality of imperial practice are antiseptically
transfigured into an economy of values; the power of technological
efficiency begets profit, induces enjoyment, and confers
rectitude. 14' Hence, Marlow's comparison recalls the humanist
reformers in Discipline and Punish who, while speaking in liberal
terms (e.g., that punishment must be equitable and humane), were
motivated by a combination of utilitarianism (i.e., punishment
must be economical) and evangelicalism (i.e., punishment must
cure the soul).'42
A number of critics find Said's distinction between manifest
and latent Orientalism troubling. 43 Ahmad accuses Said of
refusing to accept the consequences of Foucault's genealogical
approach, noting that "for the idea that there could be a discourse
... spanning both the pre-capitalist and the capitalist periods is not
only an un-Marxist but also a radically un-Foucaultian idea."'"4
This criticism, however, misinterprets Discipline and Punish.
Foucault does not argue that the desire to control bodies
originated in the disciplinary technologies of the post-
Enlightenment period, but rather he views these technologies as a
"technical mutation" of earlier forms of punishment."5 What
interests Foucault is how the modern disciplines developed a more
economical, covert, and powerful art of achieving subjugation'
46
139. Said, supra note 29, at 81 (quoting HEART OF DARKNESS).
140. Said, supra note 29, at 82.
141. ABDIRAHMAN A. HUSSEIN, EDWARD SAID: CRITICISM AND SOCIETY 250
(2002).
142. See SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 214-15.
143. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra, note 131, at 24; Aijaz Ahmad, Between Orientalism and
Historicism, in ORIENTALISM: A READER 291 (A.L. Macfie ed., 2000).
144. Ahmad, supra note 143, at 291.
145. DISCIPLINE & PUNISH, supra note 21, at 257.
146. Id.
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Said likewise shows how modern Orientalism accommodated the
new imperialism by developing more efficient and effective means
of exerting cultural domination over the non-West. 147 It did so in
the same manner as the disciplines, through temporal and spatial
techniques as discussed in the next section.
2. Orientalism's Use of Imaginative Geographies and Histories
Like Foucault's ideas about discipline, Said's theories about
cultural domination depend largely on spatial and temporal
techniques. 49 He shows how Orientalism seeks to harness the
universalizing and dividing dynamics of time and space in much
the same manner as the disciplinary technologies do in order to
achieve an effective and efficient means of subjugating the Orient.
Furthermore, although it does not present as detailed a theory of
spatial and temporal power as Panopticism, Said's book shows
how the imaginative manipulation of geography and history has
facilitated the institutions of colonialism and imperialism.
With regard to space, O'Hagan comments that, "Said's
conception of the West is strongly influenced by his Perception of
territory as land imbued with political meaning. Orientalism
presents geography as the emotional output of the West's attempt
to derive meaning out of the unfamiliar, not as a neutral and
empirical science.
[The] universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar
space which is "ours" and an unfamiliar space beyond "ours"
which is "theirs" is a way of making geographical distinctions
that can be entirely arbitrary. I use "arbitrary" here because
imaginative geography of the "our land-barbarian land" variety
does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the
distinction. It is enough for "us" to set up these boundaries in
our own minds; "they" become "they" accordingly, and both
their territory and their mentality are designated as different
from "ours." To a certain extent modem and primitive societies
147. See SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 321-22. This point also responds to
Ahmad's other criticism that "[o]ne does not really know whether Orientalist discourse begins
in the post-Enlightenment period or at the dawn of European civilization." Ahmad, supra note
143, at 288. The question is not when Orientalist discourse began, but what about that discourse
changed in the post-Enlightenment period that made it different.
148. See discussion infra Part i.
149. See Ahmad, supra note 143, at 290.
150. O'HAGAN, supra note 25, at 194.
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seem thus to derive a sense of their identities negatively.1
5
1
Therefore, not only does imaginative geography render the
unfamiliar more familiar, it also provides one with a sense of
identity. In the East-West context, Said contends that Western
culture acquired strength and identity by setting itself off against
the Orient "as a sort of surrogate and even underground self."1 2 In
performing the role of the West's weaker twin brother, however,
the Orient is not the vast extension beyond the familiar world, but
"a closed field, a theatrical stage affixed to Europe." '153
Nevertheless, no matter how close and familiar the Orient
becomes, it is always penalized for lying beyond the boundaries of
Western society. 5 4 This is because imaginative geography causes
the mind to "intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the
distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far
away." '155 Accordingly, the Orient is both incorporated into and
excluded from the West; it is brought onto the West's stage not as
an equal but as a space to be possessed, studied, and controlled.156
In Discipline and Punish, the West achieved this
exclusion/incorporation paradox through the examination or
normalizing gaze. Said describes similar spatial techniques as
employed by Orientalists in the nineteenth century, beginning with
the voluminous publication of Description de l'Egypte (1809),
which declared in its preface "le gdnie inquiet et ambitieux de
Europrens... impatient d'employer les nouveaux instruments de
leur puissance .... ' Said contends that from this moment
onward the range of representation of the Orient expanded
enormously as Europe "came to know the Orient more
scientifically, to live in it with greater authority and discipline than
ever before.,158 Supremacy was associated with knowledge of the
Orient, and no longer principally with military or economic
power.159 But in order to acquire this knowledge, scholars must
survey and arrange the rise and decline of Oriental civilization. To
151. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 54.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Id. at 63.
154. Id. at 67.
155. Id. at 55.
156. Id. at 210-11.
157. Id. at 29.
158. Id. at 22.
159. Id. at 32.
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this end, Said argues that two Orientalists, Silvestre de Sacy and
Ernest Renan, provided the scholarly tools.'6 First, Sacy
inaugurated modern Orientalism by presenting his theory of
chrestomathy: the "Orientalist is required to present the Orient by
a series of representative fragments that are republished,
explicated, annotated and surrounded with still more fragments." '
Through his anthologies, Sacy recreated the Orient with a degree
of Western rationality that was presumably missing from the
original sources. Renan's task, on the other hand, was "to solidify
the official discourse of Orientalism, to systematize its insights, and
to establish its intellectual and worldly institutions., 162 He
emphasized scientific demonstration, thereby surveying the Orient
from the vantage point of a laboratory scientist, from which he
could judge, compare, combine, and induce everything about the
Orient as if it were a specimen in a petri dish.
The comparative techniques developed by Sacy and Renan
not only allowed Orientalists to artificially reproduce the Orient
for the West, but also permitted its depiction from an essentialist
standpoint. Like the normalizing judgment, Orientalism is both
divisive and homogenizing. It is "absolutely anatomical and
enumerative: to use its vocabulary is to engage in the
particularizing and dividing of things into manageable parts. ' At
the same time, it treats its objects like atoms "in a vast collectivity
designated in ordinary or cultivated discourse as an
undifferentiated type called Oriental, African, yellow, brown, or
Muslim. ' 165 Unfortunately, these Western scholarly techniques
create an artificial and polarized distinction that limits the human
encounter between cultures, peoples, and histories. 66 Over time,
scholars reify concepts of the West and the Orient into separate,
monolithic spaces filled with heuristics that place the "East"
inferior to the "West.' ' 67 The Orient is always seen as irrational,
160. Id. at 130.
161. Id. at 128-29.
162. Id. at 130.
163. Id. at 132, 138, 142.
164. Id. at 72.
165. Id. at 252.
166. Id. at 46.
167. Several critics have misinterpreted this point and accused Said of
"Occidentalism." See Aijaz Ahmad, Between Orientalism and Historicism, in in
ORIENTALISM: A READER 289 (A.L. Macfie ed., 2000). However, Said repeatedly
maintains that any "notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically
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depraved, and childlike, while the West is viewed as rational,
virtuous, and mature.168 This binomial division between "us" and
"them" maintains a distance separating the West from the Orient
that is "destined to bear its foreignness as a mark of its permanent
estrangement. ,,169
But Orientalism's use of binomial norms does more than
provide the West with a superior self-image. When combined with
another hegemonic discourse - the global economic expansion - it
also provides "'the necessary furniture of Empire.' 170  It
accomplishes this in at least three ways. First, Orientalism's
particularizing, systematizing, and essentializing techniques supply
Western imperialists with the knowledge necessary to grasp an
entity, like the Orient, that is otherwise impossibly diffuse.71
Paraphrasing Lord Evelyn Cromer, Said writes that "knowledge of
subject races or Orientals is what makes their management easy
and profitable; knowledge gives power, more power requires more
knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of
information and control.'7 2 Second, by dividing mankind into the
categories of "Oriental" or "Occidental," it is possible to believe
that for the Oriental, "liberation, self-expression, and self-
enlargement were not the issues they were for the Occidental.,
173
This permits the imperialists to commit themselves to liberal ideals
at home, while disregarding such ideals when engaging in
conquest. Finally, Orientalism's normative distinctions provide
imperialism with a universal and moral purpose. Whether called
the "White Man's Burden" (e.g., Britain A la Rudyard Kipling),
"Manifest Destiny" (e.g., United States), or "mission civilizatrice"
(e.g., France), the important thing is "to turn the appetite for more
geographical space into a theory about the special relationship
between geography on the one hand and civilized and uncivilized
peoples on the other.' '174 Said explores this issue further in Culture
different: inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial
essence proper to that geographical space is... a highly debatable idea." Said, supra note
21, at 322. Rather, Said is simply exposing how Orientalism creates monolithic images of
both the West and the Orient in order to achieve its aim of cultural domination.
168. Said, supra note 21, at 40.
169. Id. at 244.
170. Id. at 215 (quoting Lord George Curzon).
171. Id. at 66.
172. Id. at 36.
173. Id. at 263.
174. Id. at 216.
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and Imperialism, arguing that imperialism's accumulation of land
is propelled by the ideological notion that certain people require
171domination.
17
With regard to time, Said illustrates how Orientalism
inscribes a history on the Orient similar to how the disciplines
inscribe history on the body of the criminal. To support this
proposition, Said borrows from Anouar Abdel-Malek's well-
known analysis of the way in which the Orientalist renders the
Orient both historical and ahistorical:
According to traditional Orientalists, an essence should exist
[that is] both "historical," since it goes back to the dawn of
history, and fundamentally a-historical, since it transfixes the
being, "the object" of study, within its inalienable and non-
evolutive specificity, instead of defining it as all other beings,
states, nations, peoples, and cultures - as a product, a resultant
of the vection of the forces operating in the field of historical
evolution.
176
Employing Abdel-Malek's analysis, Said shows how
Orientalism confines the Orient in the history of the West while, at
the same time, fixing the Orient permanently in the past. With
regard to the former process, Said argues that "the Orient was
reconstructed, reassembled, crafted, in short, born out of the
Orientalists' efforts.' ' 177 The Orient is viewed as essentially mystical
with no concept of history, and as such, the people of the Orient
are depicted as incapable of representing themselves.18 Thus, it is
incumbent upon the West to act as "the spectator, the judge, and
jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior."'7 9 This, in turn, means
that "what was neither observed by Europe nor documented by it
was . . . 'lost' until, at some later date, it too could be incorporated
by the new sciences."' 8 Accordingly, the Orient becomes a mere
appendage of the West with no historical significance beyond its
relationship with Europe. 8' Through the second temporal process,
175. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 8.
176. Anouar Abdel-Malek, Orientalism in Crisis, in ORIENTALISM: A READER 50
(A.L. Macfie ed., 2000).
177. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 87.
178. Id. at 21, 253, 283.
179. Id. at 109.
180. Edward W. Said, Orientalism Reconsidered, in ORIENTALISM: A READER 355
(A.L. Macfie ed., 2000).
181. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 8; SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra
note 29, at xxi.
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Orientalism has fixed the Orient in antiquity while viewing the
West as progressing forward in history, thus leaving the Orient
behind. 82 It has carried forward "a proclivity to divide, subdivide,
and redivide its subject matter without ever changing its mind
about the Orient as being always the same, unchanging, uniform,
and radically peculiar object."' Any deviation by the Orient from
norms of Oriental behavior is considered to be unnatural.' 84 As
Johannes Fabian observes, this denial of "coevalness in time"
effectively silences the West's "other."' 85
These temporal processes lead to a form of historicism in
which non-synchronous events, peoples, and cultures are
homogenized and incorporated into a single human history that
culminates in the West."" As such, the Orient is put in a difficult
position. O'Hagan observes that the East "must come to terms
with the West, yet is placed at a permanent disadvantage by its
perceived lack of capacity to change. This effectively casts the
asymmetrical relationship between East and. West, placing the
West in permanent ascendancy."'8 7 By characterizing the Orient as
both historical and ahistorical, Orientalism, much like the
disciplinary technologies, places the Orient in a terminal state of
either progressing toward or declining from, but perpetually
lagging behind, Western culture.
Through the coincidence of geography and history,
Orientalism assisted Western culture's expansion as "an
irreducible supervisory imperial authority."'i 8 According to Said,
no other instance of imperialism was as large, as totally
dominating, or as unequally powerful.'89 But the Orientalists and
imperialists did not succeed on their own. Said also implicates the
East in its adherence to the market system and to Western ideas
about modernization, progress and culture.' 9° As Said noted, "the
182. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 96; SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra
note 29, at 349.
183. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 98.
184. Id. at 39.
185.JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: How ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS
OBJECT 31-34 (1983).
186. See Said, supra note 180, at 355.
187. O'HAGAN, supra note 25, at 201.
188. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 215.
189. See SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 6-7.
190. See O'HAGAN, supra note 25, at 209.
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modern Orient... participates in its own Orientalizing,"' 91 thereby
enabling Western cultural domination to continue in the
postcolonial world despite the decline of overt imperialism.
192
Particularly after World War I, the European powers decreasingly
resorted to brute force to transform the Orient, seeking instead to
stimulate it to move independently into an essentially Western
shape and "contain[ing] the new and aroused Orient in a personal
vision, whose retrospective mode includes a powerful sense of
failure and betrayal. 
193
Efficient, covert, self-generating, omnipresent, and
omnipotent, the new imperialism bears remarkable resemblance to
Bentham's Panopticon. Foucault's description of the individual
caught in the panoptic machine (i.e., the individual is seen, but
does not see; he is the object of information, but never a subject in
communication) could alternatively be a description for the
subjects of modern imperial conquest.'9 Yet, the analogy cannot
be taken too far, as Said himself later claims, "I never talk about
discourse the way Foucault does ... as something that has its own
life and can be discussed separately from the realm of the real, or
what I would call the historical realm. I think perhaps one of the
things of which I am most proud is that I try to make discourse go
hand-in-hand with an account of conquest, the creation of
instruments of domination, and techniques of surveillance that
were rooted not in theory but in actual territory."' 96 For reasons of
resistance that will be discussed in section IV, it is vital for Said to
keep the problems of cultural domination and imperialism real,
and to show how they manifest themselves in institutions. Hence,
Said frequently classifies the United States as simply the latest
embodiment of modern imperialism.' 97 Rather than the overt
191. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 325; see SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM,
supra note 29, at 11 ("the durability of empire was sustained on both sides, that of the rules
and that of the distant ruled").
192. See SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 81 (commenting that the
global and all-encompassing modern imperialism continues today).
193. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 240-41.
194. At one point in CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, Said comments that Foucault's
analysis of the movement from sovereign to administrative surveillance is related to
British imperial policy in India, and specifically, to the work of Sir Henry Maine on the
law. ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 198-99.
195. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 200.
196.Edward W. Said, Language, History, and Knowledge, interview in POWER,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 269 (Gary Viswanathan ed., 2001).
197. Id. at 285,295.
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breed of imperialism practiced by nineteenth-century Europe, Said
contends that the U.S. is currently imposing a new, more subtle,
more dogmatically Orientalist (and therefore, more dangerous)
form of imperialism upon the non-Western world - all in the name
of a 'New World Order.' This is Said's counter-narrative.
D. International Law and the Nation-State
Foucault and Said both reject the idea that history is evolving
towards a set of universal ideals. Instead they view history as a
series of struggles for domination that simply replace earlier
118struggles. In Discipline and Punish, it is the struggle to
disassociate power from individuals and to turn this power into an
aptitude that can be controlled and increased. 99 In Orientalism, it
is the struggle to convert diverse cultures into imaginative histories
and geographies that provide the West with a superior self-
image.20 In both cases, a certain technology (e.g., the disciplines
and Orientalism) is driven by an underlying force (e.g.,
microphysics of power and the West's search for an identity)
seeking to prevail in this struggle by fabricating its subjects (e.g.,
individuals and Orientals). The subjects are then placed in a power
relation (e.g., the prison and the Orient) that uses temporal and
spatial processes to exclude and include, individuate and
homogenize, differentiate and universalize.
From this perspective, international law has little to do with
progress since any new legal order is merely a technical mutation
(as stated by Foucault) or manifest change (as stated by Said) in
power/knowledge relations. While international law may find new
ways to operate more efficiently, diffusely, subconsciously, and
silently, its ends always remain the same. Since the dawn of the
Enlightenment, international law has engaged in a struggle with a
vast and diverse array of cultures, peoples, and histories. It has
sought to prevail in this struggle in precisely the same way that
Orientalism and the disciplines have sought to dominate their
subjects: first, by fabricating its "other" - the uncivilized and
untamed world; then, by proceeding on a mission to divide and
enclose this world in the Western concept of the nation-state; and,
finally, by incorporating these nation-states into a relatively small,
198. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21; see also Smith, supra note 50, at 111.
199. See generally FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21.
200. See SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21.
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manageable Family of Nations. In this way, international law has
attempted to turn the individuating and universalistic dynamic of
the Enlightenment against the rest of the world, thereby
subjugating it and ensuring that there is only one way to structure
a polity. From this counter-narrative, the current failed and outlaw
state paradigm is simply the latest manifestation of a long struggle
that began with the first modem nation-builders in the nineteenth
century.
1. The Age of the Nation-State
At the same time that Europe was creating disciplinary
societies and the Orientalists were busy developing new ways to
elevate the West's self-image, Western international law was
undergoing a similar transformation in the context of imperialism.
Prior to the Enlightenment, international law was predominantly
based on the natural law doctrine, under which the prevailing
assumption was that law universally applied to all humankind.l
This is not to say that international relations between the Western
and non-Western societies were conducted on an equal footing.
Christian empires, in particular the Spanish and the Portuguese,
looted non-Christian societies and enslaved their peoples.20 In
addition, some pre-Enlightenment legal scholars provided moral
justifications for imperialism. As far back as the sixteenth century,
Vitoria argued that it was in the best interests of the American
Indians that Spain administer over them since the American
Indians' government lacked proper laws, magistrates, and means• • • 203
of controlling family affairs. Nevertheless, international legal
theory varied from praxis in promoting relative equality in inter-
cultural relationships.'0 Christian rulers, for instance, resorted to
papal sanction or absolution to justify or forgive their raids.
While this may have created variance between international and
canon law, it was explained by drawing "an outer circle that
embraces all mankind, under natural law, and an inner circle, the
corpus Christianorum, bound by the law of Christ.
2
0
6
With the advent of the Enlightenment, international law
201. See Abi-Saab, supra note 47, at 34.
202. Grovogui, supra note 16, at 50.
203. Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions, supra note 4, at 564.
204. See Great Powers and Outlaw States, supra note 2, at 233.
205. See Grovogui, supra note 16, at 50.
206. Martin Wight, Systems of States 128 (Hedley Bull ed., 1977).
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dislodged itself from the natural world and rooted itself in the
Western nation-state. As suggested by international law's
metanarrative, the nation-state predates the nineteenth century,
having come into existence around the time of the Westphalian
peace settlement.2w However, it is during the post-Enlightenment
period that, under the reigning legal positivism of the time,
international law proclaimed sovereign nation-states to be the only
actors in the international system and itself to be the creation of
these actors. 208 As Abi-Saab notes, international law reflected "the
Hegelian philosophy of the 'deification' of the State as the ultima
ratio, which finds in itself its end and justification. ' '209
This deification of the nation-state had three profound effects
on international law. First, instead of viewing the nation-state as a
collection of diverse cultures, peoples and histories, international
law accepted it uncritically and univocally "as the main actor, as an
ontological entity, or as an observable given institutional entity. ' ,2 °
This approach meant that the nation-state constituted much more
than the source of external relations; it acted as "the site of the
most fundamental division between inside and outside, us and
them, domestic and foreign, the sphere of citizen entitlements and
that of strategic responses. 21 ' As a result, the nation-state became
the primary source of cultural and metaphysical identity for
European societies. Because international law also derived its
identity from the nation-state, it became fully engaged in the
process of distinguishing the Western nation-states from the rest of
the "natural" and unenlightened world.2 2
Second, since international law considered itself the product
of the will of nation-states, this gave the nation-state the discretion
213to determine which societies to admit into the Family of Nations.
Recognition, therefore, was both a necessary condition for
sovereignty and a method "for the delimitation and contraction of
207.Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the
Resources Curse in Africa, 26 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 1, 56 (2005).
208. See Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions, supra note 4, at 538-39.
209. Abi-Saab, supra note 47, at 36.
210.E. Fuat Keyman, Problematizing the State in International Relations Theory, in
BEYOND POSITIVISM: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 155 (Claire
Turenne Sjolander & Wayne S. Cox eds., 1994) (internal citations omitted).
211. Id. at 154.
212. See GROVOGUI, supra note 16, at 65.
213. See GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF 'CIVILIZATION' IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 56 (1984).
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the international community, which became the community of
those who mutually recognized each other, a kind of select or
executive club., 214 Even as late as 1928, Oppenheim's International
Law advocated this constitutive approach:
[T]he Law of Nations, as a law between States based on
common consent of the members of the Family of Nations,
naturally does not contain rules concerning the intercourse with
and treatment of such States as are outside the circle .... [I]t is
discretion and not international law, according to which the
members of the Family of Nations deal with such states as still
outside the family.215
Finally, because international law no longer derived from a
source higher than the nation-state, it could no longer logically
stand in variance with its master's expansionist policies. This
created the same sort of dilemma that the humanist prison
reformers and the modern Orientalists faced. On the one hand, the
Enlightenment ideals demanded the universal principles of
emancipation and equality. On the other hand, the European
powers sought the subjugation and exploitation of non-European
societies. Accordingly, since the nineteenth century, international
lawyers have worked to reconcile the Enlightenment's
universalism with imperialism's divisionism through legal
216reasoning. International law, therefore, became "integral to
scientific administration in the imperializing project of the
Enlightenment.
217
In its quest for a legal justification for imperialism,
international law adopted a two-stepped process. First, it
established an elite society of "civilized" nation-states as a unique
and superior cultural system. Second, it gradually universalized
that system by transplanting the Western nation-state throughout
the world.2 8 It has achieved this differentiating and universalizing
project by employing in seriatim three standards: the civilization
standard, the nation-state standard, and the self-determination
standard. While the metanarrative suggests that each of these
214. Abi-Saab, supra note 47, at 36.
215. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (4th ed. 1928).
216. See Peter Fitzpatrick, The Desperate Vacuum: Imperialism and Law in the Experience
of Enlightenment, in POST-MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION AND THE DEATH
OF MAN 96-98 (Anthony Carty, ed., 1990).
217. Id. at 91.
218. GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES, supra note 2, at 235.
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standards was progressively more objective and universal than the
last, they were actually increasingly subtler, less overtly violent,
and more efficient means of perpetuating colonial subjugation
through the use of temporal and spatial techniques. In the
language of Foucault, they merely represent a transition from one
art of imperialism to another, no less skillful one.
a. The Civilization Standard
The first task for international lawyers in their quest to justify
imperialism was to devise special norms to identify which societies
were likely candidates for admission into the Family of Nations.
While the criteria were initially based on religion or geography,
the publicists quickly settled on the standard of civilization which,
of course, meant Western civilization. Only civilized states were
qualified to apply for full membership in the Family of Nations
and protection under international law. l9 Thus, Wheaton wrote in
1866 that "[t]he public law, with slight exceptions, has always been,
and still is, limited to the civilized and Christian people of
Europe," while Hall wrote in 1880 that "international law is a
product of the special civilization of modern Europe., 220 As late as
1928, Brierly defined international law as "the body of rules and
principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their
relations with one another. '22' According to Gerrit Gong, the
standard of civilization "provided a basis for international law
which not only transcended religious and geographical boundaries,
but which also proposed a practical way to make its scope
universal in fact., 222 Thus, this standard sought to universalize
through difference.
While the term "civilization" was left conveniently undefined
by international legal scholars, Gong suggests that in practice the
standards of civilization were based on the "civilized" rights a
visitor would expect to be accorded in Europe.2 23 These reciprocal
rights required, at minimum, efficient and centralized state
machinery, a judiciary independent from the executive, and the
219. See GONG, supra note 213, at 56.
220. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1866); WILLIAM
EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (6 b ed., 1880).
221. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (1928).
222. Id. at 54.
223. See GONG, supra note 213, at 54-56.
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protection of the life, liberty and property of foreigners.224 As
Westlake reasoned, "When people of European race come into
contact with American or African tribes, the prime necessity is a
government under the protection of which the former may carry
on the complex life to which they have been accustomed in their... ,,2 In other words, to be classified as civilized, the non-homes .z.. otewodtbecasfeascvlzdthnn
Western society had to conform to the fundamental internal and
external attributes of the nation-state.226 Since the nation-state was
an invention peculiar to Western culture, it is unsurprising that no
non-Western society fully satisfied the civilization standard during
the nineteenth century.
Exclusion of non-Western societies from international law
had its distinct benefits. Because the non-sovereign entity lacked
legal personality, the sovereign nation-states could treat it as they
wished. If the nation-state coveted territories that were inhabited
by tribes or nomads, these lands could be regarded as territorium
nullius.227 Where the terra nullius principle did not seem
appropriate because the non-European society had some
semblance of a stable and centralized polity, treaties of cession
could produce the same result.22 For more advanced societies, if
they appeared (as they often did) unwilling or unable to provide
basic rights to European citizens, international law permitted the
nation-states to use capitulations or unequal treaties until the non-
European society could satisfy the standard of civilization. Any of
these options left the Western imperialists with good consciences -
not only were they acting legally, but they were doing the non-
Western societies a service by helping them advance towards
civilization. 229 Like the Orientalists of the nineteenth century, these
imperialists viewed their actions not as conquest, but as liberation.
224. Id. at 64.
225.JoHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141
(1894).
226. Anghie comments that "[bloth external and internal reform had to be carried out by a
state seeking entry into the family of nations. In the external sphere, the state had to be capable
of meeting international obligations and maintaining the diplomatic missions and channels
necessary to enable and preserve relations with European states. In the internal sphere, the
state was required to reform radically its legal and political systems to the extent that they
reflected European standards as a whole." Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty
and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 53 (1999)
[hereinafter Finding the Peripheries].
227. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 45, at 202.
228. Id.
229. Abi-Saab, supra note 47, at 37.
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At first the civilization standard was an all-or-nothing affair;
either a society was or was not civilized. In Foucaultian terms, the
leper was treated as a leper. However, as the nineteenth century
wore on, international lawyers were influenced by the science of
the day, and in particular Charles Darwin's theories of evolution in
On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1881),
which they interpreted as explaining why the West was so much
more civilized than the rest of the world.20 This had two results.
First, publicists began developing more elaborate taxonomies that
divided non-European societies into various stages of
development. Thus, James Lorimer distinguished between the
civilized Westerners, the barbaric Turks and the savages (which
covered just about everyone else), while Franz von Liszt divided
the world into civilized, semi-civilized, and uncivilized peoples. 21
Societies such as Turkey, Persia, Siam, China, and Abyssinia,
which publicists admitted possessed a civilization of sorts, were
classified as barbarous or semi-civilized because their societies still
had not reached the level necessary for them to understand and
carry out the dictates of international law. Accordingly, they were
granted at most only partial recognition as entities with limited
legal rights and personalities. 32 This taxonomic approach lasted
well into the twentieth century, and in fact, was utilized by the
League of Nations mandate system which divided the former
colonies of the German and Ottoman empires into three
graduated levels with the "A-Mandatories" provisionally
recognized as independent nations "subject to rendering of
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such
time as they are able to stand alone;" the "B-Mandatories"
administered under conditions that will guarantee freedom of
religion, conscience, and trade; and the "C-Mandates"
administered "under the Mandatory as integral portions of its
territory" in light of "the sparseness of their population, or their
small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or
their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory.
233
The second scientific advancement in the civilization standard
230. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 72.
231. Abi-Saab, supra note 47, at 38. Lorimer further subdivided societies as criminal,
unchristian, imbecilic, immature, progressive and non-progressive. SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS,
supra note 2, at 238-39.
232. GONG, supra note 213, at 56.
233. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.
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was that it acquired a mission. Non-Western societies were not
forever destined to wallow in their primordial existence, but rather
could evolve linearly through various stages of development.... 234
towards European civilization. This led humanist international
lawyers to advocate tutelage that - much like Demia's scheme for
teaching the children of Lyon to read - would guide non-Western
societies incrementally towards Western civilization. Arguably, the
British Colonial Office took its tutelage responsibilities the
furthest by creating an extensive list of stages that its colonies must
go through to achieve independence that mimicked Britain's own
constitutional development. 23' However, a colony could progress
only so far. As Gong notes,
[p]rogress toward "civilized" status was necessary and possible
for the less "civilized" to achieve, but complete and perfect
equality was not. Like Sisyphus, the less "civilized" were
doomed to work toward an equality which an elastic standard of
"civilization" put forever beyond their reach . . . . The
"civilized" had a way of becoming more "civilized" still.236
In this way, international law could comply with the
Enlightenment ideal of promoting universal equality and
emancipation, and yet treat parts of that humanity as perpetually
inferior, through the same form of imaginary historicism that
Abdel-Malek and Said attribute to Orientalism.
All three international institutions that have directly
addressed the issue of colonialism have readily adopted the
civilizing mission. Article 6 of General Act of the Conference of
Berlin of 1884-85 states that "[a]ll Powers exercising rights of
sovereignty or an influence in [the basin of the Congo] engage
themselves to watch over the conservation of the indigenous
populations, and the amelioration of their moral and material
conditions of existence., 237 In a similar vein, Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations founded "a sacred trust of
civilization" that assigned advanced nations the responsibility to
tutor former colonies that were "not yet able to stand by
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern word.",
238
234. See GONG, supra note 213, at 105-06.
235. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 95-96.
236. GONG, supra note 213, at 63.
237. General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 12 (Supp. 1909)
[hereinafter Conference of Berlin].
238. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.
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And, while the word "civilization" was avoided in the UN Charter
(no doubt because the atrocities committed by the West during
World War II rendered the use of this term hypocritical), Chapter
XI reaffirms that the member states administering non-self-
governing territories are bound to accept "as a sacred trust the
obligation to promote to the utmost . .. the well-being of the
inhabitants of these territories," including the development of self-
government "according to the particular circumstances of each
territory and its peoples and their varying stages of
advancement."239 Moreover, Chapter XII of the Charter set up a
trusteeship system to administer the former colonies of the Axis
powers, the former mandates under the League Covenant and any
territories the imperial powers chose to place under the system.2
Through these international civilizing missions, economic
exploitation no longer became simply a means of profit, but rather
it was considered indispensable to the progress of the uncivilized
society. Just as Marlow found a moral efficiency in modern
imperialism, the Congress of Berlin sought simultaneously the
"moral and material" well-being of the natives. 241 Likewise, the
League's Permanent Mandate Commission promoted efficient
communities by placing the market, which was associated with
modernity, over custom and tradition, which were considered
backward.242 Similarly, Chapter XI of the UN Charter uses the
term "economic" four times, while it employs the term "self-
government" only twice (and avoids the term "independence"
completely). 243 Thus, while condemning the outright exploitation of
non-Western peoples by chartered companies early in the
nineteenth century, the international humanists saw a moral
benefit in the international development and exploitation of the
resources of colonial, mandate, trust, or postcolonial lands.
244
Indeed, the Bretton Woods institutions perpetuate this tradition in
seeking the well-being and development of Third World countries
by integrating their economies into the Western economic
239. U.N. Charter art. 73.
240. U.N. Charter art. 75. See also Gordon, supra note 2, at 910 (arguing that "utilizing the
trusteeship model presupposes that Western modes of governance, politics, and social thought
should triumph").
241. Finding the Peripheries, supra note 226, at 64.
242. Anghie, supra note 4, at 587-88.
243. U.N. CHARTER art. 73-74.
244. Anghie, supra note 4, at 586.
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system.245
In short, the civilization standard used both spatial and
temporal techniques to control the entry of non-Western societies
into the international legal order and to ensure that the Family of
Nations consisted of a relatively small group of homogeneous
nation-states. Like the lepers described in Discipline and Punish,
the civilization standard excluded non-Western societies from the
international legal order, and like Orientalism's treatment of the
Orient, this was achieved by employing a civilized/uncivilized
binomial that essentialized the Western nation-states as always
civilized, modern, and efficient and the non-Western societies as
perpetually uncivilized, backwards, and inefficient. Towards the
end of the nineteenth century, some semi-civilized non-western
societies were brought into the international legal fold - the lepers
began to be treated as plague victims - but they were placed at the
periphery with only partial legal personality and rights until they
achieved Western civilization. Temporally, the world was divided
between the Western nation-states that made history and the non-
Western societies that lacked history.2 4 Those that lacked history
could acquire one only by entering Western history through the
civilizing mission. However, just as the Orient is never allowed to
catch up to the superior West, international law always classified
the non-Western societies as less civilized than the always-
advancing nation-states of Europe. As a result of this
"universalization of the European experience," international law
managed to erase a large number of non-Western cultures,
247peoples, and histories.
b. The Nation-Building Standard
With the advent of the League of Nations, a new standard for
achieving international law's universalizing and dividing project
rose to prominence. While the League of Nations Covenant
limited its membership to "fully self-governing states, ' 24 in
practice "the League tended away from the principle of
homogeneous universality . . . towards that of heterogeneous
universality." 249 This shift from exclusion to inclusion is
245. Id. at 628-29.
246. SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS, supra note 2, at 236.
247. Finding the Peripheries, supra note 226, at 7.
248. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 1.
249. Georg SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER 94
[Vol. 27:401
Rethinking the Purpose & Function oflnt'l Law
attributable to three factors. First, President Wilson was
outspoken about the need for the new international legal order to
be worldwide because attempts in the past to create exclusive
international orders had failed for the very reason that their
membership had been restricted.250 Second, a number of the
"uncivilized" states had assisted the Allies in the war, and
therefore, it seemed inherently unjust to exclude them from the
new world order. Finally, without the United States or the Soviet
Union among its membership ranks, the League simply lacked the
strength to impose its will on an outside world.251 Yet, the drafters
of the Covenant did not opt for allowing just any community of
peoples into the "heterogeneous" international legal order, but
rather only those communities considered nation-states. Unlike
the civilization standard, this new standard of admission was not
constitutive, but rather declaratory according to predetermined
criteria, 2 summarized in the 1933 Montevideo Convention as a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.53 However, while
seemingly neutral and objective, these criteria are in fact loaded
with Western biases. As Muntarbhon argues, the nation-state
standard emanates:
From the perception of European powers towards their
colonies and the rise of nation-states from these colonies. The
characteristics of 'permanent population' and 'defined territory'
are based upon a sense of control and identity drawn from
European experiences, that is, control by the government over
its population and defined borders.., and an identifiable link
between the government and its population in the form of
nationality.2
To paraphrase Said, while the language of the nation-state
standard was one of objectivity, the latent positivity of the
civilization standard remained constant. 5
(1936) [hereinafter THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER].
250. Id. at 23-24, 49.
251. Id. at 175-76.
252. See Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1123-24 (1995).
253. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (4th ed. 1990).
254. V. MUNTARBHON, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN ASIA 5 (1992).
255. Gordon agrees with this point in arguing that "[a]though the jargon has changed,
the models advocated continue to represent Western modernization ideologies, which the
South ... must adopt and against which its progress will be judged." Ruth Gordon, Saving
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To understand the implications of this new standard for
membership, one must grasp the scope of the Western nation-
building in Asia and Africa prior to World War I. Before Western
colonization, the Asian continent consisted of thousands of
sovereign and semi-sovereign communities.5 6 Most of these Asian
communities did not have centralized, unitary governments with
extensive bureaucratic administrations.257 Rather, the monolithic
nation-state and its expansive infrastructure were imported from
West to assist the Europeans in consolidating their authority over
their vast colonial territories.25 According to Darling, the basic
values and institutions of the nation-state "were most vividly
personified and demonstrated by the hierarchy of civil servants
administering the official colonial policy" because they "depicted
the idea of the Western nation-state as the combination of a fixed
'national' territory, a populace united by a common pattern of
'national' loyalties, and a sovereign political authority
administering a common body of 'national' law.,
259
These large administrative structures in turn led to the fixing
of territorial borders and the imposition of nationality and
immigration laws in order to facilitate the unification process and
to regulate population flows. 260 Because these colonial divisions
often cut across traditional frontiers, even the Asian communities
not directly colonized had their boundaries and foreign relations
altered by the imperialists.26' Beyond infrastructural and boundary
changes, the Western colonial administrators also sought to
introduce the Western view of progress as the individual and
collective advancement toward a predetermined purpose or goal.
According to Darling, this alien philosophy "clashed severely with
ascriptive loyalties and intensified achievement consciousness," as
well as precipitating dissatisfaction with the status quo and
failed States: Sometimes A Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 903, 961
(1997).
256. For example, what is today India contained over five hundred semi-sovereign
states. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 45, at 101.
257. See V. MUNTARBHON, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN ASIA 9 (1992).
258.FRANK C. DARLING, THE WESTERNIZATION OF ASIA: A COMPARATIVE
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 161-62 (1979).
259. Id. at 161.
260. See MUNTARBHON, supra note 254, at 6-7.
261. See ALISTAIR LAMB, ASIAN FRONTIERS: STUDIES IN A CONTINUING PROBLEM
215-22 (1968).
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engendering cultural secularization. In transplanting the
European nation-state into Asia, therefore, the Western colonial
administrators tried to propagate in a matter of decades the same
values, institutions and codes of conduct that had taken many
centuries to develop in the West and that were peculiar to Western
culture, history and philosophy.
Africa underwent nearly an identical nation-building process
during its colonization by the West. Before the advent of
colonialism, Africa was a "complicated lacework of more than a
thousand variously defined political societies - some isolated and
some interdependent, some free and others slave, some entangled
in imperial relations, others in feudal ties, and so on."2 63 Even Pfaff
recognizes that when the Europeans first arrived, they found
"coherent, functioning societies of varying degrees of
sophistication, some of great political subtlety and artistic
accomplishment, others simple hunting and gathering communities
... but all possessing their own integrity and integrated into the
natural environment of the continent. ',264 Nevertheless, many of
the political attributes that make up the Western nation-state - for
example, centralized government, fixed territories, a large
bureaucracy, organized military, public means of transport,
extensive division of labor and communications - were missing
from the vast majority of the African continent. The Berlin
Conference changed this by legalizing the division and
subordination of the continent to the Western empires. No
representatives from the African peoples were invited to the
Conference because, while the General Act contained some
humanitarian language, the main motive for partitioning Africa
was to prevent conflict between the Western nation-states. 6'
Besides, under the positivist international law of the day, the
Africans lacked the international legal personality to give
consent.266
The map drawing that ensued as a result of the Berlin
Conference carved up Africa according to which European nation-
states claimed effective control over a given territory. In doing so,
the European Powers treated all of sub-Saharan Africa as a blank
262. See DARLING, supra note 258, at 163-64.
263. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 68.
264. Pfaff, supra note 8, at 3-4.
265. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 69.
266. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 70.
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slate, paying little attention to pre-colonial relationships between
traditional societies, and compressing the thousands of
communities into some forty unitary nation-states.267 Mutua notes
that for many Africans "the newly contrived state represented...
the physical symbol of the loss of independence and sovereignty
over their societies. ' '26' Thus, the colonizers in Africa - like their
counterparts in Asia - built vast and artificial political jurisdictions
by lumping distinct peoples, cultures and histories into to a handful
of arbitrarily created territories in what has been aptly labeled "an
international enclosure movement.,
269
While international law's metanarrative portrays the nation-
state standard as a step toward universality and objectivity, the
extensive nation-building efforts in Asia and Africa (and
elsewhere) suggest otherwise. The nation-state itself can be viewed
as a metaphorical prison that incarcerated innumerable diverse
communities of cultures, peoples, and histories. These imaginative
geographies were neither neutral nor universal but rather were
based on Western values, biases and practices. Just as the
disciplines make the individual, and the Orientalists create the
Orient, international law fabricated these nation-states as a means
of control and subjugation. International law chose the nation-
state over the civilization standard for the same three reasons that
the carceral city was chosen over the punitive city. First, the
nation-state acts as a buffer between the international community
and nationalist groups in the colonies, which the West perceived as
immoral, irrational, and a threat to the stability of the
international legal order.210 It therefore silences resistance. Second,
with the expansion of the Family of Nations, international law
needed a means of subjugation and control that could be effective
against a potentially large number of subjects. The nation-state
provided such a mechanism by reducing the number of
international actors to a relatively small and controllable lot.
Finally, because the nation-state is a normalizing judgment that is
also hierarchically structured, it provided a subtle and efficient
means of enforcing conformity and eliminating difference with
each nation-state acting as a normalizing gaze over the peoples
267. Mutua, supra note 252, at 1113, 1134.
268. Id. at 1113, 1137.
269. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 71.
270. See Guyora Binder, The Case for Self-Determination, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 223,
224-25 (1993).
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within its borders.
4. The Self-Determination Standard
The most recent technical mutation of the civilization
standard is that of self-determination. Although the concept of
self-determination that had inspired the American and French
revolutions, and that President Wilson presented to the post-
World War I international community, was based on the principle
of government by popular consent, such a revolutionary concept
would have subverted international law's universalizing and
dividing project by permitting practically any form of unified
peoples to become international actors.27' Instead, the League of
Nations opted for a version of self-determination that favored
territoriality over all other forms of identity such as culture,
history, tradition, or opinion. 7 ' Thus, while the Allies of the First
World War allowed the Balkanization of Europe, they did not
apply Wilsonian self-determination to Africa or Asia, choosing
273
instead to maintain preexisting territorial boundaries. In this
way, international law was able to use the self-determination
standard to continue the process of "validating and essentializing"
the colonial nation-state.
Likewise, although the UN Charter lists among its purposes
the "self-determination of people," the term "people" has not
been interpreted in the sociological sense, but rather once again
within the colonial territorial framework. 5 Indeed, nowhere in the
Charter is it suggested that the colonial nation-state is a nullity or
that sovereignty should be returned to pre-colonial peoples in the
process of preparing them for independence. Rather, as Matua
observes, "[t]he Charter in fact says the opposite: it recognizes the
right to political self-determination only for those territorial units
that are 'internationally determined' of which the colonies are the
classic example. 2 76 Thus, self-determination of people under the
271. Id. at 525.
272. See Joshua Castellino, Territory and Identity in International Law: The Struggle for
Self-Determination in the Western Sahara, 28 MILLENIUM 523, 523 (1999).
273. See Binder, supra note 270, at 223, 227-29.
274. Mutua, supra note 252, at 1113, 1137.
275. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2; see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
230-31 (2003).
276.Mutua, supra note 252, at 1113, 1140. Grovogui argues that "like the mandate
system it replaced, the trustee system was in practice another form of colonial control,
primarily organized around the military, political and economic interests of the colonial
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Charter means nothing more than the self-determination of the
colonial nation-state.
Even the UN General Assembly resolutions that spurred the
rapid period of decolonization from 1950 until the early 1970s
perpetuated the colonial nation-state. While both the 1960
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514) and the 1970 Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
(Resolution 2625) call for a speedy and unconditional end to
colonialism, they adhere to the doctrine of uti possidetis (i.e., the
maintenance of pre-existing boundaries regardless of how they
were established). These Declarations, therefore, limited the right
of self-determination to those territories officially recognized by
the UN as former colonies. 7 As a result, self-determination has
become "perhaps the single greatest influence on the shaping of
the map of the world today" as well as "in the creation and
maintenance of modern postcolonial identities., 27 8 By freezing the
territorial boundaries that were arbitrarily established by the
colonial powers, this doctrine has effectively prevented groups
within these artificially created colonial nation-states from
establishing their own identities and destinies in the international
• 271
community.
Ironically, it was the postcolonial nation-states themselves
that advocated this territorially delimited definition of self-
determination. While the former colonial nation-states argued that
the doctrine of uti possidetis was necessary to preserve their fragile
governments during the transition to independence, the leaders of
the independence movements in the former colonies were usually
educated in the West and supported in government posts by the
former imperialist powers. '0 As a result, they had a vested interest
in the preserving the centralized administrative apparatuses - the
281Gesellschaft - of the imperialist powers. Put more polemically,Grovogui argues that "the African elites surrendered political and
powers." GROVOGUI, supra note 16, at 151.
277. See Binder, supra note 270, at 223, 238. This interpretation was confirmed in the
International Court of Justice decisions in the Namibia and Western Sahara cases. See
Advisory Opinion, Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16); Advisory Opinion, Namibia,
1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 16).
278. See Castellino, supra note 272, at 523, 527.
279. Id. at 523, 529.
280. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 903, 959.
281. See DARLING, supra note 258, at 161.
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economic initiative and subscribed to a discourse that legitimated
the liberal state, proscribed any form of ownership other than
capitalist, and recognized colonial structures and boundaries.
282
Moreover, the international community protected these
postcolonial regimes from secessionist claims as long as they kept
meeting the Western criteria for the nation-state. Just as the
Orient participated in its own Orientalization, the former colonies
perpetuated their own subjugation by using self-determination as a
means of maintaining the Western image of statehood rather than
as a means of challenging it.
We have witnessed how international law has used the
civilization, nation-state, and self-determination standards to
achieve its universalizing and dividing project. Through this
project, international law has placed diverse communities of
cultures, peoples, and histories in a double prison. First, these
communities have been imprisoned in the imaginative geography
of the colonial nation-state, and second, these artificial nation-
states have been imprisoned within an international order that
seeks to preserve them into perpetuity through territorially
delimited legal norms. Temporally, international law subjects these
diverse communities to the same historical/ahistorical process that
Abdel-Malek and Said describe in the context of Orientalism. The
individual histories of these various cultures and peoples are
interrupted, erased, and replaced by the history of the colonial
nation-state. Moreover, because international law preserves these
nation-states as the imperialists left them, the peoples contained
within these nation-states are likewise frozen in the past. Far from
promoting progress, nation-building and self-determination have
effectively silenced the progress of thousands of pre-colonial
narratives. In Nietzsche, Genealogy and History, Foucault finds
legal rules "are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized" that
can be bent to any purpose by those who are able to seize them 85
The "universal" norms of self-determination and sovereignty
illustrate this point by showing that the way one defines a legal
term, and who does the defining, can have a profoundly
homogenizing and controlling effect on those against whom the
282. GROVOGUI, supra note 16, at 197.
283. See Binder, supra note 270, at 223, 237.
284.Martti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal
Theory and Practice, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 241, 252 (1994).
285. See Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy and History, supra note 54, at 85-86.
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term is employed. Moreover, these norms show how words can
project into the future the arbitrary and senseless violence of the
past.
Perhaps what is most troubling about this international
disciplinary machine is that it is self-sustaining. Just like Bentham's
Panopticon, there is no need for a king in the international
community because all nation-states act as their own jail keepers.
With regard to the postcolonial nation-states, their leaders have a
strong interest in preserving the status quo, as it assures their
privileged positions and preserves their legitimacy among fellow
nation-states in international society. Indeed, that the international
disciplinary machine is de-individualizing and automatizing offers
an explanation why recent international nation-building missions
in Kosovo and East Timor are equally staffed by citizens of former
colonies and their former colonizers, and why some African
academics are urging the reintroduction of the UN trusteeship
system in parts of Africa with African and Asian nation-states
participating as mandatory powers.2 6 However, the analogy to the
Panopticon can be taken even further, as Anghie does in his study
of the League of Nations. He argues that the League's mandate
system constituted a new technology of monitoring and
management by which knowledge about colonial territories was
collected from the furthest peripheries, consolidated and then
subjected to a number of interpretive processes including
administration, legislation and adjudication.2 This knowledge was
also synthesized by eminent colonial administrators so that the end
result was that "the natives existed more vividly in Geneva, than
they did in the mandate territories themselves."' ' Moreover,
following in the footsteps of the humanist prison reformers, the
mandate project sought to regulate behavior through persuasion
rather than physical force; it sought to render the native "visible
and amenable to the mechanisms and techniques of administration
through the vocabulary of birth rates, productivity, wage rates, and
so forth."2 89
What Anghie says about the mandate system can certainly be
said about the United Nations, which had a program budget of
286. See Ali Mazrui, Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign Colonization, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 4, 1994.
287. See Anghie, supra note 4, at 513, 614.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 513, 617.
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$2.536 billion for fiscal year 2000290 and a secretariat of
approximately 8,900 civil servants drawn from some 160
291countries. Since 1948, the UN has operated 59 peacekeeping
operations around the world, and each year it produces
approximately 400 publications. 292 The United Nations is an
enormous bureaucratic machine that is constantly collecting,
analyzing, processing, combining, and penetrating almost every
aspect of the nation-states that are on its agenda. Moreover, when
one of its members falls out of line, the UN Security Council has
the power to subject that nation-state to a highly repressive regime
of stigmatization, sanctions and surveillance as it did to Libya
(Resolutions 731, 748, 883), Serbia (Resolutions 1203 and 1244)
Afghanistan (Resolution 1333) and Iraq (Resolution 687 and
688).293 It is not entirely ironic, therefore, that the very man that
developed the concept of the Panopticon also wrote an essaY "to
submit to the world a plan for universal and perpetual peace." 2
In sum, the counter-narrative described above shatters four
myths contained within international law's metanarrative. First, it
rejects the common perception that the practices of imperialism
and colonization were historical aberrations that were remedied by
the post-1945 decolonization project. Rather, as Anghie argues,
these practices "continue to play a role in contemporary
international relations and generate important analytic categories
that have an enduring and crucial significance to our
understanding of international law as a whole. ' '29 Second, this
counter-narrative rejects the common perception that terms such
as sovereignty and self-determination are neutral. Instead, these
290. A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS 15 (Helmut Volger ed.,
2002) [hereinafter CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA].
291. BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS 15 (Dep't of Public Info. 2000). This
figure excludes employees of the United Nation's twenty-one programs (such as the World
Food Program and UNICEF) and nineteen specialized agencies (such as the World Bank
and ILO). The World Bank alone has a staff of some 11,000 and administrative annual
budget of $1.4 billion, and the World Food Program has staff of over 5000 and an annual
budget of $1.5 billion. Id. at 42, 52.
292. CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 290, at 15.
293. Simpson contends that outlaw states such as Iraq and Serbia are incarcerated
within a separate legal regime without democratic rights and subject to continual
surveillance and occasional disciplinary violence. See Simpson, Two Liberalisms, supra
note 3, at 537, 570 (discussing Western legal scholars' various definitions of an "outlaw
state").
294. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 45, at 15.
295. See also Anghie, supra note 4, at 513, 518 (2002) (discussing how the World Bank
and IMF seek to promote good governance through conditions on development loans).
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rights derive from conceptions of society and politics that are
296definitely Western. Finally, it rejects the perception that nation-
building is purely an altruistic endeavor. Rather, underneath every
civilizing mission or the nation-building project lingers always an
economic motive as well. When placed in the context of this
counter-narrative, the failed/outlaw state phenomenon is neither
new nor ephemeral, but rather is a "history of the present"
extending at least as far back as the Berlin Conference but
arguably to the West's first attempts at nation-building. If this is
the case, then contemporary nation-building in places such as
Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq are simply colonialism in
297new dress.
IV. RESISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Orthodoxy
The last section placed international law in the context of
Foucault's and Said's theories about domination to show how it
has used the spatial and temporal processes of universalism and
division in an effort to reduce, essentialize, homogenize, and
control a vast array of cultures, peoples and histories. This section
addresses whether this effort has faltered in light of the current
crisis of failed and outlaw states. As Said points out, usually the
first reaction to violence committed by a member of the ex-
colonial world against a law-abiding and successful Western
nation-state is to ask, "[W]hy don't they appreciate us, after what
we did for them?, 29s A range of theories then follow this initial
reaction, blaming the violence on the Third World's own
backwardness, corruption or inability to come to terms with
Western ideals. At the polar extremes of these theories are the
ideas of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.
To explain the current onslaught of anti-Western sentiment,
296. GROVOGUI, supra note 16, at 4.
297. Gathii, supra note 9, at 1996, 2024-25. Wilde comments that the type of
international territorial administration used in Kosovo and East Timor is "protection -
and colonialism - in a new guise ostensibly serving objectives set by the member states of
international organizations collectively, rather than by European states individually. It
enables the same underlying process without attracting the opprobrium that the foreign
state administration model, especially in the colonial context, came to attract in the
twentieth century." Wilde, supra note 2, at 583, 602.
298. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 22.
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Fukuyama divides the ex-colonial world into two groups. The first
comprises the nation-states of the underdeveloped world whose
economic development lags so far behind that of the West that for
the foreseeable future they will remain in history.299 The second
group consists of fundamentalist Islamic nation-states which,
although more advanced than many of the Third World countries,
nonetheless harbor deep animosity towards the West.3°° Neither
group, however, presents a credible threat to the international
order of liberal nation-states because the former are nothing more
than violent police states at the whim of corrupt dictators, and the
latter are based upon religious superstitions that are no longer
relevant in the post-historical world. Moreover, they both put forth
futile efforts to resist the fact that "[m]odern economics - the
process of industrialization determined by modern natural science
- is forcing the homogenization of mankind, and is destroying a
wide variety of traditional cultures in the process." 301
Huntington, who got his idea about a clash of civilization
from Said's nemesis,30 2 argues that the interactions among peoples
of different civilizations enhance the "civilization-consciousness"
of those peoples, which then invigorates historical differences and
animosities."' Particularly divisive, is the process of economic
modernization and social change throughout the world, which
although bringing Western power to its apex has caused a "return
to the roots phenomenon" in less advanced non-Western
civilizations.3 0 Moreover, these non-Western civilizations do not
share "Western ideas of individualism, liberalism,
constitutionalism, human rights, equality, the rule of law,
democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state."3 °5 As
a result of this inevitable clash, the West must maintain its
economic and military supremacy to protect its interests, while at
the same developing a more profound means of obtaining
299. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 17, at 235; see also HOWARD WILLIAMS, DAVID
SULLIVAN & E. GWYNN MATTHEWS, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY
109-22 (1997).
300. FUKUYAMA, supra note 17, at 234-38.
301. Id. at 235.
302. See generally Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, 266 THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 60 (1990).
303. Huntington, supra note 17, at 26.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 40.
2005]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
knowledge about the other civilizations.3°
Rather than viewing them as opposites, Said sees the theories
of Huntington and Fukuyama as equally apologetic of an "exultant
Western tradition."3 7 Both views oversimplify characterizations of
the West and East, failing to recognize that cultures are hybrids,
heterogeneous, and "so interrelated and interdependent as to
beggar any unitary or simply delineated description of their
individuality."3°8 Moreover, Foucault and Said show that while in
some ways both theories are correct, they ultimately miss the
point. Huntington correctly views resistance as inevitable, and
Fukuyama correctly observes the homogenizing effects of Western
liberal democracy. However, neither theory recognizes how
international law creates and perpetuates these dividing and
homogenizing phenomena. It is neither cultural difference nor
global modernization, but the disciplinary machine of international
law - currently rooted in the concept of the nation-state - that is
the underlying cause of failed and outlaw states.
B. Is Foucault Against Resistance?
There are two places in Discipline and Punish where the issue
of resistance emerges in relation to the disciplinary technologies.
First, during his discussion of how the micro-physics of power
produce docile bodies, Foucault comments that the power
exercised on the body is not conceived as property or a privilege,
but as a strategy or a "network of relations, constantly in tension"
that goes "right down into the depths of society." As a result,
"[t]he overthrow of these 'micro-powers' . . . is not acquired once
and for all by a new control of the apparatus nor by a new
functioning or destruction of the institutions. ' ' 309 As Bob Fine
suggests, by depicting power as a network of relations, Foucault
argues that the overthrow of the disciplinary apparatus requires
the formation of new networks of relations.31° Simply seizing power
from the ruling class, or even destroying existing institutions, will
leave the micro-powers intact. The problem is that Foucault offers
no guidance on how to go about identifying and destroying these
micro-powers. While a revolt may direct its forces towards
306. Id. at 49.
307. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 349.
308. Id.
309. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 272.
310. See Fine, supra note 71, at 310.
[Vol. 27:401
Rethinking the Purpose & Function of Int'l Law
something tangible like a ruling class or a state institution, it is
difficult to fathom how to revolt against a strategy.
The second place in the book where resistance is implicated is
during Foucault's discussion of delinquency. He acknowledges that
the prison system is not very effective at eliminating illegality or
reforming prisoners.31' While some might classify these failures as a
form of resistance to the penal system, Foucault remarks that
"[f]or the observation that prison fails to eliminate crime, one
should perhaps substitute the hypothesis that prison has succeeded
extremely well in producing delinquency, a specific type, a
politically or economically less dangerous - and, on occasion,
usable - form of illegality." '312 Relating delinquency to his theories
of Panopticism, Foucault further states that in the panoptic society
the delinquent
is not outside the law; he is, from the very outset, in the law, at
the very heart of the law, or at least in the midst of those
mechanisms that transfer the individual imperceptibly from
discipline to the law, from deviation to offense. Although it is
true that prison punishes delinquency, delinquency is for the
most part produced in and by an incarceration which,
ultimately, prison perpetuates in its turn.31
Thus, the true function of the prison is not to eliminate illegality
but rather to create one which is easily supervised, limited to an
enclosed group of individuals, kept on the fringes of society, and
useful economically and politically.
Given his theories of micro-power and delinquency, it is easy
to see why Foucault's attitude toward resistance is often
characterized as pessimistic. In fact, when it comes to resistance,
Said is one of Foucault's biggest critics. In Culture and
Imperialism, Said pities how Foucault "turned his attention away
from the oppositional forces in modern society which he had
studied for their undeterred resistance to exclusion and
confinement ... and decided that since power was everywhere it
was probably better to concentrate on the local microphysics of
power that surround the individual., 315 In an essay, Said accused
311. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 272.
312. Id. at 277; see also From Torture to Cellblock, in FOUCAULT LIVE 146, 147
(Sylvire Lotringer ed., 1996) (interview of Michael Focault).
313. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 349.
314. Fine, supra note 71, at 324.
315. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 26.
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Foucault of being "on the side of power" because the
"undifferentiated power he seemed to ascribe to modern society"
was "irresistible and unopposable. 3 16 Said blames Foucault's
pessimism on "a singular lack of interest in the force of effective
resistance" which he attributes in turn to Foucault's
disenchantment with the insurrections of the 1960s and the Iranian
revolution.317 It is suggested here that Said goes too far with his
criticism of Foucault. In an essay published after Discipline and
Punish, Foucault wrote that
[i]t would not be possible for power relations to exist without
points of insubordination which, by definition, are means of
escape. Accordingly, every intensification, every extension of
power relations to make the insubordinate submit can only
result in the limits of power. The latter reaches its final term
either in a type of action which reduces the other to total
impotence (in which case victory over the adversary replaces
the exercise of power) or by a confrontation with those whom
one governs and their transformation into adversaries.318
Thus, power permeates society through points of resistance.
As Elden observes, under Foucault's conception of power,
resistance is everywhere there is power.319 "This is why there is no
single focus for resistance, just as there is not a single focus for
power. Resistance is the 'other,' the opposite of power.,
320
The more valid criticism, therefore, is not that Foucault's
conception of power prevents resistance (it in fact depends on it),
but rather, why, under his conception of knowledge and power,1 21
anyone should or would resist. It is difficult to locate a clear
answer in his works. However, one possibility is that resistance
speaks by giving a voice to the subjected. "It is through revolt that
316. Said, Foucault and the Imagination of Power, supra note 32 at 151.
317. Id.
318. DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 60, at 225. In an interview, Foucault remarked
that "aside from torture and execution, which preclude any resistance, no matter how
terrifying a given system may be, there always remain the possibilities of resistance,
disobedience, and oppositional groupings." Space, Knowledge and Power, in THE
FOCAULT READER 239, 245 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984) (interview of Michael Focault by
Paul Rabinow and translated by Christian Hubert).
319. See ELDEN, supra note 85, at 106-07.
320. Id. at 107. Said recognizes this point, stating that "Foucault seems paradoxically to
have stimulated himself and his audience to a greater degree of sovereign authority, as if
to illustrate his own thesis that power produces resistance, and resistance, new forms of
power." Said, Foucault and the Imagination of Power, supra note 32, at 264.
321. See ELDEN, supra note 85, at 106.
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subjectivity.., introduces itself into history and gives it the breath
of life . . . . One does not have to maintain that these confused
voices sound better than the others and express the ultimate truth.
. . it is sufficient that they exist and they have against them so
much which is set up to silence them . . . it is due to such voices
that the time of men does not have the form of evolution, but
precisely that of a history.'3 22 Another possibility is that resistance
exposes by acting "as chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power
relations, locate their position, find out their point of application
and the methods used. 3 23 Finally, and perhaps most relevant to
this article, resistance re-directs by showing us that "the target
nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we
are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get
rid of this kind of political 'double bind,' which is the simultaneous
individualization and totalization of modern power structures.
3 24
In short, for Foucault, the process of resistance serves very
important purposes in society even if it can never triumph over the
micro-physics of power that envelop the individual.
C. Is Said Overly Optimistic About Resistance?
Thus far, this article has showed how Said's ideas about
cultural domination in many ways resemble Foucault's theories
about discipline, particularly in regard to how time and space are
used as a means of control. Orientalism elevates Foucault's
concepts from their Eurocentricity and applies them globally and
perhaps more tangibly, while Discipline and Punish adds depth
and complexity to Said's sometimes overly political rhetoric. But it
is on the issue of resistance that Said has vocally distanced himself
from Foucault, and it is argued here that this issue is the primary
source of division between the two academics' ideas.
Said needs to resist. It is integral to his personal politics as
well as his own identity as a Palestinian victim of imperialism
322. Michel Foucault, Is It Useless to Revolt?, 8 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 8 (1981).
323. DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 60, at 211; see also Michel Foucault & Noam
Chomsky, Human Nature: Justice versus Power, in REFLEXIVE WATER: THE BASIC
CONCERNS OF MANKIND 171 (Fons Elders ed., 1974) ("[T]he real political task in a
society such as ours is to criticize the working of institutions which appear both neutral
and independent . . . in such a manner that the political violence which has always
exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked.").
324. DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 60, at 216.
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exiled to a Western metropolis.32 Although often dismissed as
polemical, Said's commentaries on the Middle East probably make
up the largest part of his writings. Indeed, many of his theories
presented in Orientalism were outlined in an essay he wrote about
the Arab-Israeli October War of 1973. In that essay, he proclaimed
that Arab resistance to Israeli-Western imperialism has shattered
the myth of the Arabs as passive, supine and impotent Orientals.326
At bottom, resistance requires three things: (1) the possibility of
resistance; (2) something to resist against; and (3) a reason for
resisting. Orientalism and its sequel, Culture and Imperialism,
develop Said's thoughts on each of these three components, as well
as explain many of his divergences from Foucault's ideas on power
and resistance.
With regard to the possibility of resistance, Orientalism itself
offers the non-Westerner little hope. Throughout the book, Said
maintains that the Oriental is effectively silenced by the
representations of the Orientalist. "[I]f the Orient could represent
itself, it would; since it cannot, the representation does the job, for
the West, and ... for the poor Orient., 327 Even when Said briefly
addresses decolonization, he appears to primarily credit the
European empires with the initiative.328 In an interview, Said
explained,
I was trying to look at the way in which a certain view of the
Orient was created and accompanied, or perhaps was used to
subordinate the Orient during the period of imperialism
beginning with the conquest of Egypt by Napoleon. And that's
all I was trying to do. I had nothing to say about what the
Orient was really like. I said nothing about the possibility of
resistance to it.
329
Yet, even in Orientalism Said begins to sow the seeds for his ideas
about independent choice and responsibility, proclaiming that
"unlike Michel Foucault . . . I do believe in the determining
imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise anonymous
325. ASHCROFT & AHLUWALIA, supra note 27, at 117.
326. See Edward W. Said, Shattered Myths, in MIDDLE EAST CRUCIBLE 427 (Naseer
H. Aruri ed., 1975).
327. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 21.
328. See id. at 240-41. His views changed little when he revisited the topic of
Orientalism in 1985 and wrote that the Orient was "not Europe's interlocutor, but its
silent Other." Said, Orientalism Reconsidered, supra note 180, at 349.
329. Said, Language, History, and Knowledge, supra note 196, at 269.
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collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like
Orientalism."
3
The sea change comes with Culture and Imperialism in which
Said dedicates an entire chapter to the topic of resistance, argues
that resistance has existed since the dawn of modern imperialism,
and directly criticizes Foucault's conception of power as providing• 331
no possibility for political resistance. He distances himself
further in a 1996 interview where he not only implies that Foucault
is wrongly labeled a rebel, but he attributes his "writing from the
point of view of power" to his homosexuality and sadomasochistic
tendencies. 332 As discussed above, Said wrongly charges Foucault's
theories with not allowing the possibility of resistance. Indeed,
Said speaks in Foucaultian terms when he argues that "history also
teaches us that domination breeds resistance. 333 More accurately,
Said's criticism of Foucault hinges on the other two conditions for
resistance.
With regard to the need for something to resist against, both
Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism provide a tangible
alternative to Foucault's all-consuming micro-physics of power.
Although Said also characterizes Orientalism as a family of ideas
and a way of thinking, he provides the non-Western dissident with
easily identifiable institutions of Western cultural dominance and
imperialism, as well as a whole list of former and current
Orientalists who are perpetuating myths about the non-West.
Unsurprisingly, this has exposed Orientalism to methodological
criticism. On the one hand, Foucault's micro-powers are necessary
to show how Orientalism has permeated civil and global society -
namely, the media, academics and the arts. But, on the other hand,
Said identifies the West, the former colonial powers, and in
particular the United States and Israel, as definite loci of cultural
domination .334This sounds like trying to have one's cake and eat it
too, but it is understandable in the context of Said's need to resist.
As Kennedy remarks, "Said sets out to reconnect European
scholarship and literature on the Orient with the political contexts
of imperialism" but "chooses as one of his major theoretical
330. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 23; see HUSSEIN, supra note 141, at 239-
240.
331. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 191.
332. Said, Language, History, and Knowledge, supra note 196, at 268.
333. See SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29.
334. See KENNEDY, supra note 131, at 26.
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sources a thinker who . . . refers to a model of power which
obscures the' role of a central locus of power in producing
oppression. 33 5 Yet, as mentioned before, Foucault's theories are
not wholly incompatible with the idea of resisting against
something tangible. In an essay published after Discipline and
Punish, Foucault writes that he does not wish to deny the
significance of institutions, only that "one must analyze institutions
from the standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa.
336
He then goes even further by remarking how power relations have
been increasingly governmentalized and centralized in state
institutions, and by calling for our liberation "from the state and
from the type of individualization which is linked to the state.,
337
Thus, Foucault does not oppose resistance to institutions per se.
It is contended here that where Said and Foucault truly
diverge is on the reason for resisting. For Said, the answer is plain:
emancipation and enlightenment. In Orientalism, Said employs
instruments of humanistic research to assist him in studying
Orientalism, and where he criticizes Enlightenment scholars, it is
not for their universal pronouncements, but for their failure to
apply their value system abroad.338 He further disassociates
Enlightenment ideals from their originators in his 2003 preface to
Orientalism where he draws the distinction between "the will to
understand for purposes of co-existence and humanistic
enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes
of control and external dominion., 339 Likewise, in Culture and
Imperialism, he argues that the eighteenth century principles of
emancipation and enlightenment were turned against their authors
as they "mobilized people in the colonial world to rise up and
throw off imperial subjection,"'3 40 and further suggests that a
universalism that is neither limited nor coercive is possible.3 41 And,
when Said agrees with Enlightenment thinkers such as Adorno, he
does not hesitate to praise them, leading one critic to observe that
he "wishes to complete the work of earlier European humanists..
by extending Enlightenment concepts of human and political
335. See id. at 27.
336. Foucault & Chomsky, supra note 323, at 222.
337. Id. at 224.
338. See SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 26, 254.
339. Id. at xiv.
340. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at xiii.
341. Id. at 277.
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rights to the peoples of the non-Western world.",14' Less
sympathetically, Ahmad accuses Said of positing against what he
debunks "the values, precisely, which he has learned from that
very tradition: tolerance, universality, non-racialistic pluralism,
liberalism, humanism, sympathetic participation in the emotional
experience of the Other, etc." '
However, Said's advocacy of Enlightenment values is not
without purpose. Shocked by how Islamic nationalist and
fundamentalist groups adopted Orientalism as a manifesto to
essentialize and denigrate the West,3" Said was understandably
eager to develop a theory of resistance that clearly rejects all
dogmatic orthodoxy. He found help in Frantz Fanon's distinction
between nationalism, in which "nationalist consciousness can very
easily lead to frozen rigidity; merely to replace white officers and
bureaucrats with colored equivalents 3 45 and liberation, in which a
people move beyond national consciousness to social
consciousness. 3" In other words, true liberation from cultural
domination requires rejecting separatism and triumphalism for a
more integrative view of human community and culture.
Moreover, liberation requires entering into the discourse of the
West and making it recognize marginalized or forgotten histories -
what Said calls "the voyage in. '" ' Thus, Said's concept of
liberation is tied to his advocacy of multicultural discourse as the
solution to the dogmas associated with both Orientalism or
Occidentalism.-4
In espousing his theory of liberation, Said recognizes that
nationalism is often the necessary and inevitable response to
Western domination as diverse peoples unite against a common
enemy.349 Moreover, he attributes the staying power of nationalism
to the West's imposition of the nation-state on newly decolonized
342. See KENNEDY, supra note 131, at 34. Another commentator notes that "Said sees
the politics of difference as achieving the universal tolerance that liberalism preaches, but
fails to achieve." JOHN McGOWAN, POSTMODERNISM AND ITS CRITICS 172 (Cornell
Univ. 1991).
343. Ahmad, supra note 143, at 286.
344. See SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 331-33, 335-36, 338.
345. See SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29.
346. See id.
347. Id. at 239.
348. See SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at 338 (promoting over uncritical
nationalism "the idea that communities of interpretation exist within and outside the
Islamic world, communicating with each other in a dialogue of equals").
349. Id. at 263.
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states. "The national identity struggling to free itself from
imperialist domination found itself lodged in, and apparently
fulfilled by, the state."35 In an interview, Said argues further that
the creation of postcolonial nation-states "gives rise to embattled,
emergent resistance movements which then in turn . . . fall into
homogenized unities, imagined communities." These imagined
communities then become "reified, stable entities, and on them is
built the usually repressive apparatus of the national security, one-
party state. 3 5' This "pathology of power" occurs no matter how
much the postcolonial government may try to conform to the
global processes or external norms.352 Similarly, he describes
fundamentalism as a kind of Fraudian transference in which
governments that feel powerless against the West turn their
frustrations toward repressing their own populations, which then
leads to a further sense of resentment, anger, and helplessness.353
In both cases, cultural identity becomes unnaturally associated
with the nation-state, differentiating "us" from "them" and
typically leading to xenophobia and coercive campaigns for the
return to cultural roots. Yet, notwithstanding the inevitability of
nationalism or fundamentalism, Said insists that these orthodoxies
must not stand in the way of true liberation because any other
view would accept the racial, religious, and political divisions
imposed by imperialism, thereby resigning the world to the
"senseless" dynamics of an essentialized world.355
Said's ideas about emancipation and enlightenment clearly
differ from Foucault's viewpoints. Ahmad does not exaggerate too
much when he proclaims that "Foucault was quite possibly the
most rigidly anti-Humanist writer of our time. 356 As Hussein
comments, Said attempts to move beyond Foucault, contending
that "for ideology critique to be effective, the intellectual must
posit a utopian moment beyond Foucault's powerfully effective
but largely negative criticism. 3 57 But in doing so, Said moves away
from postmodernism. Thus, O'Hagan observes that Said's work
350. Id. at 319.
351. EDWARD SAID: A CRITICAL READER 233 (Michael Sprinker ed., 1992).
352. Id. at 236.
353. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 21, at xxi.
354. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at xiii.
355. See Id. at 276, 333.
356. Ahmad, supra note 143, at 285-286.
357. HUSSEIN, supra note 141, at 129.
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straddles the boundaries between the modern and postmodern in
much the same way that his life straddled boundaries, disciplines,
and worlds."" Just as Foucault's aversion to politics made him go
postmodern, Said's attraction to politics drove him from
postmodernism. While Said found his struggle in native peoples'
preservation of geographical territory,"' Foucault centered his in a
"non-place" to which neither adversary belongs, and consequently,
no one can glory in it.36°
D. Resistance and International Law Reconsidered
The separation of two phenomena - colonization and the
failed or outlaw state - has been based on the widespread claim
among Western liberal scholars that since decolonization, all states
are equal under international law and the norms of international
law are neutral, apolitical, and universal. 6 ' Based on this
assumption of postcolonial redemption, international law has been
able to wash the colonial past from its hands and attribute the
current crises of failed and outlaw states to inadequate domestic
leadership and modernization in the Third World. Indeed, one
commentator argues that the rapid decolonization following the
Second World War can be viewed as the classic example of "be
careful what you wish for" because the Third World nation-states
simply lacked the political maturity upon independence to fully
exercise their sovereignty and self-determination within the
international system.362 This assumption, however, blinds us to the
way in which international law's disciplinary machine is ultimately
responsible for perpetuating the failed and outlaw state problem.
As Fitzpatrick notes, "[w]hen the universal project of
Enlightenment confronts the limits of its appropriation of the
world, it creates the very monsters against which it so assiduously
sets itself."36'
A handful of scholars have observed how current issues of
collapsing or rogue states are tied to the inherent characteristics of
the postcolonial nation-state. Franck, for example, argues that
there has been a revival of tribal self-determination that challenges
358. O'HAGAN, supra note 25, at 190.
359. See, e.g., SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 252.
360. See Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy and History, supra note 54, at 76, 85.
361. GROVOGUL, supra note 16, at 182.
362. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 21.
363. Fitzpatrick, supra note 216, at 105.
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the widely perceived belief in an irresistible trend in human history
toward modernism and globalization and away from both tribalism
and nationalism.3 64 He labels this revival "postmodern neo-
tribalism" which he partly attributes to "the backlash against the
anomy fostered by centripetal socialization and
bureaucratization," as well as "the rise of the enlightened state
from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century in Europe ...
[which] succeeded in unifying small principalities, republics, and
city-states into larger national entities" that often "encompassed
diverse religious and ethnic groups."'3 65 Postmodern tribalism,
therefore seeks a political and legal environment that facilitates
the break up of multicultural nation-states into "unicultural"
366ones.
Akbar Ahmed argues that one of the worst legacies of
Western modernism is the nation-state, particularly in the way it
has manifested itself in Africa and Asia.3 7 "The nation-state, in its
monolithic power, its desire to centralize, corrupt and control, its
security apparatus characterized by unlimited power and limited
imagination, is often an unmitigated disaster for the less privileged,
in particular the minorities." He traces many of the present
tensions in non-Western politics to the ignorant nation-building
exercises of the European colonizers.
For example, the majoritarian rule has led to a form of
democratic tyranny in which religious or ethnic majorities deny
minority groups any say in economic or political decisions, thus
leaving no alternative for these minority groups but to resort to
violence.369 In other words, contrary to its supposedly universal and
multicultural purpose, the nation-state has in fact led to cultural
particularism. Unlike Franck, however, Ahmed does not consider
tribalism a derogatory or regressive term. Rather, he sees the
modern state as having "sapped the tribal system of its vitality.
Indolence and fatalism have taken the place of its 61an."37°
Castellino, Mutua, and Jackson all agree that the wave of
364. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 140-41 (1995).
365. Id. at 140-44.
366. Id. at 143-44.
367. AKBAR S. AHMED, POSTMODERNISM AND ISLAM: PREDICAMENT AND PROMISE
129-30 (rev. ed. 2004).
368. Id. at 130.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 134.
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decolonization that followed the Second World War is directly
implicated in the current collapsed and rogue state phenomenon.
Castellino attributes the problem to the uti possidetis doctrine.
While peoples of different cultural, ethnic or religious
backgrounds united to remove a common foreign enemy, after
decolonization they gradually realized that they had little in
common with each other and set about trying to secede from the
postcolonial nation-state.37' Mutua likewise places the contrived
citizenry of the African nation-state at the center of the Third
World crises. In addition, he also believes that African nation-
states, although formally independent, have remained
conceptually colonial entities because Africans have simplY2
occupied the seats left vacant by the departing European powers.
Along these lines, Jackson attributes the problem of the failed or
outlaw state to the fact that the benefits of statehood have yet to
trickle down to the citizenry at large whose lives have scarcely
improved, and may even have been adversely affected, by
independence.373 While illegitimate and often incompetent rulers
of what Jackson calls "quasi-states"' are fully recognized by
international law, members of the general population who seek to
reform the system through the only means available to them -
resistance and rebellion - are disparagingly shunned as separatists,
secessionists or irredentists.374
Said and Foucault add depth to this discussion by showing
that opposition is inevitable so long as the imbalance in power
relations continues. Thus, international law is wrong to view
resistance or rebellion as abnormal or illegitimate; instead, it is an
integral component of the current state of national and
international relations.
Moreover, Said's ideas linking resistance to the nation-state
not only align with the views of the scholars mentioned above, but
they offer a further explanation: decolonization did not equate
with true liberation from colonialism. The distinction between
nationalism and liberation places Franck's theories about
postmodern neo-tribalism within a proper temporal perspective.
Popular support for this movement as well as for religious
fundamentalism is not so much due to a desire to return to the past
371. See Castellino, supra note 272, at 530.
372. See Mutua, supra note 252, at 1145.
373. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 41.
374. Id.
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as it is to a desire to return to the future. The diverse cultures,
peoples and histories that were silenced by the nation-state have
never stopped searching for a way to regain their national and
international voices. Unfortunately, they have learned that the
only language to which the international community listens must
be equally essentialist and reductive as that of international law.
What the world is facing, then, is not a clash of civilizations, but a
clash of two languages - neither of which actually represents any
existing culture, people, or history. While Said dislikes both
Orientalism and fundamentalism, he argues that the latter is in
many ways a necessary and inevitable response to the former. True
liberation, therefore, requires the elimination of the essentialism in
both the language of resistance and the language of international
law.
Foucault's theory of delinquency presented in Discipline and
Punish offers a significantly different perspective to the current
crisis in international law. To paraphrase Foucault, one should
perhaps substitute the hypothesis that international law has
succeeded extremely well in producing delinquent nation-states for
the observation that international law fails to eliminate failed and
outlaw states. Delinquent nation-states are not outside
international law but in the very midst of international law's
disciplinary mechanisms. This approach explains the way in which
the West has traditionally treated those who rule illiberal nation-
states.
When these nation-states were colonies, the colonial
administrators were often the focal point of indigenous opposition
to colonial rule. Notwithstanding, these civil servants never acted
to permanently suppress nationalism, but rather they would
encourage it so long as it did not threaten the overthrow of the
colonial nation-state itself.375 As the colonial administrations
withdrew from these nation-states, they frequently handpicked
their successors based not on whether the new ruling elites were
democratic or humanitarian, but rather on whether the former
imperial powers thought they could control them. Since
decolonization, international law has unqualifiedly guaranteed
these nation-states' survival no matter how repressive, corrupt,
violent or disorganized they become, so long as they generally play
375. See DARLING, supra note 258, at 175.
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by the international (i.e., Western) rules. 6 Indeed, as Jackson
points out, the international community often compensates these
"ramshackle states" for their illiberality and underdevelopment
with economic assistance.377
Finally, during the Cold War, the postcolonial nation-state's
existence, as well as the repressive and corrupt elites that
controlled it, were preserved by the East-West balance of power.378
Either these nation-states were considered off limits by the two
superpowers, or the superpowers used them as pawns and
collaborators in their global contest. Thus, just like a delinquent in
the panoptic society, the delinquent nation-states created by
decolonization were tolerated, and even encouraged, in the Cold
War era. This remained true so long as they remained an easily
supervised and enclosed group of states on the fringes of
international society that were useful economically and politically
to international power relations. However, once one of these states
moved beyond delinquency by posing a direct threat to the
international legal order, then the international community felt
justified in intervening and, if necessary, destroying and rebuilding
the failed or outlaw state.
However, with the end of the Cold War, and the resulting
decrease in interest by hegemonic powers to prop up repressive
postcolonial nation-states, the diverse cultures, peoples, and
histories within these nation-states began to reassert themselves
against their repressive and illegitimate regimes. This rebirth of
resistance took the international community by surprise as it had
already been assumed that all of these voices had been long
silenced by the homogenizing effects of nation-building. With
postcolonial nation-states around the world in a tenuous existence,
the modern international disciplinary machine began losing its
centering hold.
Nevertheless, through the 1990s, the international disciplinary
machine managed to teeter through the 1991 Iraq War, the
Rwanda Genocide, the anarchy in Somalia, the Bosnian War, and
the Kosovo conflict. But after the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, the chaos proved too much and hegemonic powers such
376.Thus, John Rawls argues that internally illiberal states should remain part of
international society so long as they abide by the basic norms of procedural justice
operating in the international legal order. See generally DARLING, supra note 258.
377. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 23-24.
378. See Mutua, supra note 252, at 1160.
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as the United States no longer held themselves bound by an
international legal order that could not maintain the conformity it
was designed to achieve.
President Bush, therefore, laid down the "new" international
legal order by dividing the world in two: "Every nation, in every
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you
are with the terrorists."" 9 He also returned to the same
civilized/uncivilized binomial employed by Westlake, Hall and the
other post-Enlightenment legal scholars. He declared in a speech
before the UN General Assembly that "[e]very civilized nation
here today is resolved to keep the most basic commitment to
civilization . . . . Civilization itself, the civilization we share, is
threatened. History will record our response . . . . The civilized
world is now responding."38 Afghanistan was the first victim of this
new international legal order, but it is Iraq that is the
quintessential outlaw state.
V. IRAQ AND THE INTERNATIONAL DISCIPLINARY MACHINE
Having reviewed the various universalizing and
differentiating practices that international law has used to contain
and control its natural and uncivilized "others," we can better
understand how the ongoing conflict in Iraq is both a continuation
of and a deviation from these practices. To begin with, the Iraqi
nation-state is an imaginative geography upon which the West has
inscribed its own history. As part of the Ottoman Empire since
1634, Iraq managed to avoid the direct effects of Western, t• 381
imperialism until after the First World War. With the dissolution
of the Ottoman Empire, however, Iraq became an A-Mandate
territory under the League of Nations with the United Kingdom as
its mandatory power. As they had done in sub-Saharan Africa and
Asia in the nineteenth century, the Allied Powers redrew the map
of the Middle East based on their own strategic considerations and
secret pacts, 2 paying little attention to the interrelations between
379.George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People (Sept. 20, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
print/20010920-8.html.
380. George W. Bush, Address to UN General Assembly (Nov. 10, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/print/20011110-3.html.
381. See POLITICAL PARTIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 174-75
(Frank Tachau ed., 1994) [hereinafter POLITICAL PARTIES].
382. See Robert Fisk, Iraq, 1917, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), June 17, 2004, at Review
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long-established communities. Thus, for example, the Kurdish
community was split between half a dozen newly defined nation-
states .383
Britain initially attempted to rule Iraq directly, particularly in
light of the valuable oil deposits discovered in the territory;
however, this led to strong resistance by nationalist groups3 1 After
quelling the rebellion through large "cost-effective" aerial
bombing campaigns and the use of poison mustard gas in 1920,
Britain decided to opt for indirect rule instead.385 This still meant
that the British installed their preferred leader as king, established
a parliamentary monarchy modeled on their own and entered into
a treaty with Iraq that granted them lucrative oil concessions and
access to military bases.3 After renewing the Anglo-Iraqi treaty,
Britain assisted Iraq with the speedy termination of its mandatory
status,387 and in 1932, Iraq was granted formal independence
(although British influence remained significant) and League
membership upon promising to protect the various minority
groups living in the nation-state.
The Iraqi nation-state began its decent into international
delinquency in 1941 when a group of nationalists took over the
Iraqi government. After granting British troops permission to land
in Basra, the nationalist government threatened to shoot down
British planes taking off from al-Habbaniyyah air base if they
carried evacuees. Britain considered these actions a violation of
the Anglo-Iraqi treaty and acts of war, and therefore attacked and
defeated the Iraqi military, reoccupied Iraq, and re-installed a pro-
British government.389  While the monarchy maintained a
semblance of control over Iraq over the next 17 years, in 1958 an
2. For instance, Transjordan, which did not constitute a unified entity prior to World War
I, was created as a result of a secret agreement between France and Britain in 1916. See
POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 381, at 259.
383. See AHMED, supra note 367, at 133.
384. See Patrick Cockburn, Britain's Role in Shaping Iraq, BBC, Feb. 3, 2003, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2719939.stm.
385. See David Omissi, Baghdad and British Bombers, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 1991); see
also generally Robert Fisk, Iraq, 1917, INDEPENDENT (June 17, 2004); POLITICAL
PARTIES, supra note 381, at 75; see Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of
International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of
Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 588-89 (2002).
386. See POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 381, at 175.
387. See id at 472.
388. See id.; Cockburn, supra note 384.
389. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 45, at 179.
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army coup brought nationalist parties - including the Arab
Socialist Resurrection (Ba'ath) Party that included Saddam
Hussein among its younger ranks - back into power.3" The
nationalist government abolished the monarchy and parliament
and forged strong military and cultural relations with the Soviet
Union, thus insuring its preservation by enmeshing itself in the
Cold War.391 In a 1968 coup, the Ba'ath Party finally consolidated
its control over the government and suppressed all internal
opposition - in particular, the Communists, Shi-ites and the Kurds
- through violence and intimidation.392 As deputy to Ba'ath
President Bakr, Saddam Hussein began building the political base
that enabled him to emerge as party leader, chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council, president, prime minister, and
commander in chief of the armed forces in 1979.29' Within a year,
Saddam embarked on a war against Iran that lasted until 1988.394
While officially neutral, declassified documents reveal that the
United States provided significant financial, military and technical
support to Saddam upon deciding that post-revolutionary Iran
posed a threat to American interests. 95 Saddam diverted some of
this assistance to help maintain internal control over rebellious
groups, including the infamous poison gas attack on Halabja in
1988 that killed 5,000 Kurds.3 6 Iraq had learned much from its
colonial masters.
Iraq's status as a useful and manageable international
delinquent was jeopardized when it invaded the (equally artificial)
nation-state of Kuwait in 1990, and the UN Security Council
determined that invasion to be a breach of international peace and
security.39 For Said, the coalition action that followed to "liberate"
Kuwait was yet another example of cultural domination premised
on the essentializing dogmas of Orientalism and colonialism: "that
a small Third World dictatorship, nurtured and supported by the
390. See id. at 182.
391. Id. at 182-83.
392. See id. at 184-85.
393. See id. at 186-88.
394. See POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 381, at 188-89.
395. See National Security Archive, The Saddam Hussein Sourcebook, (Dec. 18, 2003),
at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsaarchiv/special/iraq/index.htm.
396. See AHMED, supra note 367, at 135.
397. See G.A. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932nd mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1990); G.A. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc S/INF/46
(1990).
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West, did not have the right to challenge America, which was
white and superior. '3 9 After coalition forces drove Iraq from
Kuwait, the UN Security Council employed several spatial and
temporal techniques to discipline and control Iraq. Spatially, this
disciplinary regime stationed UN observers ten miles inside the
Iraqi border to monitor a demilitarized zone, established a border
commission to re-determine Iraq's frontiers, sent teams of
international weapons inspectors to search for and oversee the
destruction of chemical, nuclear and biological weapons, and
imposed classical trade sanctions. 399 Later, this regime was
expanded to include no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq
after the UN Security Council condemned Iraq for suppressing
Kurdish and Shi'ite rebels who had supported the coalition forces
during the conflict.4w From inside and out, Iraq was divided,
differentiated, organized, monitored, and supervised in an
international effort to make the errant nation-state permanently
visible and entirely subjugated.
Temporally, the UN Security Council resolutions that
imposed the sanctions and surveillance were timeless and
universal. Resolution 678 broadly permitted the use of force "to
restore international peace and security in the area," and not just
to drive Iraq from Kuwait. Moreover, these penalties applied to all
peoples of Iraq, regardless of whether they historically supported
Saddam or the war against Kuwait. Furthermore, Resolution 687
provided no date upon which its burdensome regime of sanctions,
surveillance and stigmatization would cease.4°1 As Foucault wrote
in Discipline and Punish, "[t]he ideal point of penalty today would
be an indefinite discipline: an interrogation without end, an
investigation that would be extended without limit to a meticulous
and ever more analytical observation, a judgment that would at the
same time be the constitution of a file that was never closed, the
calculated leniency of a penalty that would be interlaced with the
398. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 359.
399. See G.A. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2963rd mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47
(1991); SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS, supra note 2, 293-94.
400. See G.A. Res. 687, supra note 399, at 11.
401. See John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 567
(2003) (arguing that UN Resolution 687's authorization on the use of force had not
expired because "[w]hen the Security Council has taken the serious step of ending its
authorization to use force, it has only done so ... either by expressly terminating the prior
authorization or by setting an up-front deadline").
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ruthless curiosity of an examination., 402 The UN sanctions
following the first Gulf War came very close to this ideal.
Thus, having already imprisoned the diverse cultures, peoples
and histories of Mesopotamia in the Iraqi nation-state, the United
States led the international community to set about imprisoning
this nation-state within a repressive international disciplinary
regime. Simpson has drawn a parallel between such a regime and a
prison:
In the case of criminal states, there is control through exclusion
followed by a mixture of surveillance and community-
sanctioned violence .... Pushing this metaphor further, one
might argue that the outlaw state is incarcerated within a
separate legal regime without rights and subject to continual
surveillance and occasional disciplinary violence. 43
To administer this prison, the United Nations both implicitly
and explicitly made the U.S. and its allies the wardens. But with
this responsibility came "an indispensable autonomy" to
individualize and vary the application of the penalty based on the
judgment of the warden. 40 Accordingly, it was the coalition forces,
and not international law or its institutions, which determined
when, where, and how to enforce the disciplinary regime.""
While the international disciplinary regime did not render
Iraq a docile nation-state, between 1991 and 2002 it did appear
that Iraq returned to a controllable form of delinquency. Iraq
would occasionally flout the authority of the prison wardens, and
the wardens would occasionally discipline Iraq with bombing
campaigns, but the situation appeared to pose no immediate threat
to the international legal order. However, after September 11 the
U.S. perceived the international legal order as no longer able to
ensure the subjugation of its non-Western "others." So, it took
matters into its own hands and returned to a form of overt and
grotesque imperialism that the post-Enlightenment international
lawyers had sought to minimize through their nation-building
efforts. In Foucaultian terms, the United States returned to the
402. See generally, FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21.
403. SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS, supra note 2, 313-14.
404. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 21, at 246.
405.This authority allowed the United States, Britain and France to bomb Iraqi
territory at their discretion without seeking additional Security Council resolutions. Ruth
Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-
Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 576, 579 (2003); see, e.g., Yoo, supra note 401, at 570.
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ancient form of punishment: torture and the execution. Thus, the
second Gulf War can be viewed as a confrontation between the
surplus power of the king and the body of the condemned man, or
as Said observes, as "a personalized struggle between, on the one
hand, a Third World dictator.., and, on the other, the president
of a country which has taken on the mantle of empire inherited
from Britain and France. ' ,4° As with the execution, this excessive
and overt means of punishment unsettled large groups of people
around the world, leading to public demonstrations as well as
increased threats of terrorist attacks. Additional acts of terrorism
and displays of power, all enhanced by the media's coverage, lead
to what Said calls a "senseless dynamic":
The fear of terror induced by the overscale images of
"terrorism" and "fundamentalism" . . . hastens the individual's
subordination to the dominant norms of the moment. Thus to
oppose the abnormality and extremism embedded in terrorism
and fundamentalism . . . is to uphold the moderation,
rationality, executive centrality of a vaguely designated
"Western" ... ethos. The irony is that far from endowing the
Western ethos with the confidence and secure "normality" we
associate with privilege and rectitude, this dynamic imbues "us"
with a righteous anger and defensiveness in which "others" are
finally seen as enemies, bent on destroying our civilization and
way of life.4
Yet, the former international legal order - and along with it,
the international disciplinary machine - continues to breathe. In
the debate over the second Gulf conflict, international lawyers
fixated on the issue of whether the UN Security Council had
previously authorized the United States and its allies to re-invade
Iraq - suggesting that if it had, then the violence that ensued would.... 408
have been more justifiable and less imperialistic. Moreover,
despite President Bush's expressed aversion to nation-building and
no clear indication from Iraqis that they wanted international help
in rebuilding their nation, the coalition forces were quickly joined
"by a whole army of private contractors and eager entrepreneurs
to whom shall be confided everything from the writing of
textbooks and the constitution to the refashioning and
406. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 29, at 300.
407. Id. at 310.
408. See generally Lori Damrosch & Bernard Oxman, Note, Agora: Future
Implications of the Iraq Conflict: Editors' Introduction, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (2003).
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privatization of Iraqi political life and it is oil industry." The
Coalition Provisional Authority set about immediately to build a
new liberal democracy, promulgating regulations and orders on
everything from de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society, to privatization
of state-owned industries, to establishing competitive banks, to
amending the nation-state's patent and copyright laws to make
them conform to international standards. Perhaps then, this
battle between the king and the condemned man occurred only
momentarily outside the international carceral city to which we
shall all soon return.1
VI. CONCLUSION
Robert Cover observes that law is "the projection of an
imagined future upon reality., 41 2 This article has attempted to
show that international law is trapped between two imagined
futures: one that is divisive, and the other that is universalizing;
one that predicts the end of history, and the other that predicts a
perpetual clash of civilizations. While both offer an explanation of
the ongoing problem of failed and outlaw states, neither sees that
the international legal narrative that we have chosen has had a
profound impact not only on our own lives, but also on the
cultures, peoples, and histories that are different from our own. So
long as we continue to employ spatial and temporal techniques to
universalize and divide our "others," international law will never
amount to more than a means of suppressing and silencing those
who do not conform to our vision of the world. True to the post-
modernist approach, this article does not offer solutions, only new
ways to ask questions. Perhaps Said comes closest to providing
such an answer when he advocates liberation and multiculturalism.
But can international law march to the beat of a thousand drums?
Will such a rhythm produce cacophony or Beethoven symphonies?• . .413
Will it be anarchy or the ultimate liberation? An international
409. Id.
410. See generally Coalition Provisional Authority, May 16, 2003, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2719939.stm.
411. As this article was written, the world awaits the first elections in Iraq since the
second Gulf War, which the Bush Administration has marked as the watershed moment at
which Iraq rejoins the international legal order.
412. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1604 (1986).
413.Boutros-Ghali has questioned, "Could the United Nations discharge its
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which we are now living.
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